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1 Introduction
Racial discrimination is a pervasive phenomenon that affects many spheres of society
(Arrow, 1998; Bertrand and Duflo, 2017; List, 2004). In the United States, several studies
have documented high levels of racial discrimination in various domains, such as the
labor market (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004), the housing market (Bartoš et al., 2016;
Edelman et al., 2017), sports (Price and Wolfers, 2010), and the judicial system (Abrams
et al., 2012; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2014).
To deal with this large degree of racial discrimination, the US government has
introduced policies aiming to actively counteract the effects of racial discrimination.
However, Americans are deeply divided in their support for such policies. For instance,
while 73 percent of Democrats support affirmative action programs for racial minorities,
only 38 percent of Republicans support this.1 There is a strong perception in the public
debate that this political disagreement is rooted in differences in perceptions of the extent
of racial discrimination in society (Newkirk, 2017). Furthermore, in a seminal article on
the drivers of opposition to pro-black policies, Bobo and Kluegel (1993) argue that it is
necessary to correct people’s biases in beliefs to gain support for pro-black policies.
In this paper, we provide the first causal evidence of the relationship between people’s
beliefs about racial discrimination against blacks and their support for pro-black policies.
Specifically, we address the following two questions using incentivized data on people’s
beliefs and support for pro-black policies: First, do Republicans and Democrats hold
different beliefs about the extent of racial discrimination in society? Second, would a
convergence in beliefs about the extent of racial discrimination in society reduce the
differences in support for pro-black policies between Republicans and Democrats?
We introduce a new approach to elicit quantitative and incentivized beliefs about
1https://news.gallup.com/poll/184772/higher-support-gender-affirmative-action-race.
aspx (accessed November 30, 2018).
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racial discrimination. With respondents from a high-quality, probability-based sample
of the US household population, we elicited incentivized beliefs about the results of a
correspondence study testing for racial discrimination against blacks in the labor market
(Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004).2 Respondents were told that researchers sent out
resumes that were identical in all respects except for the perceived race of the sender to
help wanted ads in Boston and Chicago newspapers. After informing the respondents that
resumes with white-sounding names had to be sent out ten times to get one callback on
average, we asked them how many times they thought that resumes with black-sounding
names had to be sent out to get one callback on average. In contrast to traditional survey
questions, which typically ask about “how much discrimination is there” on a scale from
“a lot” to “none at all,” this approach allows us to elicit quantitative and incentivized
beliefs about racial discrimination in a precisely defined environment.
To examine whether beliefs about racial discrimination causally affect people’s sup-
port for policies aiming to counteract the effects of racial discrimination, we introduced
exogenous variation in people’s beliefs by informing a random subset of the respondents
about the actual results from the correspondence study by Bertrand and Mullainathan
(2004), namely that white-sounding names received 50 percent more callbacks for in-
terviews than black-sounding names. To measure whether people update their beliefs
about racial discrimination in response to this evidence, we elicited their beliefs about a
second correspondence study that tested for racial discrimination in the housing market
(Edelman et al., 2017). Furthermore, to measure whether the information provision
affects people’s political behavior, respondents decided whether to receive money versus
making a real donation to a pro-black civil rights organization. Finally, respondents an-
swered a series of questions on self-reported views on pro-black policies. We document
several novel findings on beliefs about racial discrimination and support for pro-black
2While the correspondence study by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) was conducted in 2001 and
2002, a recent meta-analysis of field experiment on racial labor discrimination in the US shows no change
in racial discrimination over time (Quillian et al., 2017).
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policies in America. Our first finding is that 55 percent of Americans overestimate the
extent of racial discrimination against blacks. Beliefs vary systematically by people’s
self-identified party affiliation: Republicans are about 19 percentage points less likely
than Democrats to overestimate racial discrimination in the labor market. Republicans
are thus more accurate in their beliefs about racial discrimination than Democrats are.
While Republicans on average overestimate the extent of racial discrimination by 16
percent (i.e., how many resumes with black-sounding names had to be sent out to get one
callback on average), Democrats overestimate the extent of discrimination by 71 percent.
Second, eliciting incentivized beliefs about the results from a second correspondence
study in the housing market, we document that people’s beliefs about racial discrimina-
tion respond strongly to the research evidence. Treated Republicans and Democrats hold
virtually identical beliefs about racial discrimination. Third, we find that the provision
of information about racial discrimination causally affects people’s political behavior:
Treated respondents who underestimate the extent of racial discrimination increase their
donations by 17 percent of a standard deviation. This effect size corresponds to almost
one-third of the Democrat–Republican difference in donations. However, since the
increase in donations among those who underestimate discrimination is entirely driven
by non-Republicans, the treatment fails to narrow the Democrat–Republican difference
in donations. Furthermore, examining treatment responses on self-reported attitudes
towards pro-black policies, we find that these are generally unresponsive to new infor-
mation. Overall, these findings demonstrate that correcting people’s biases in beliefs
about the extent of racial discrimination is not sufficient to reduce political polarization
in support for pro-black policies.
To address concerns about social desirability bias, we conducted an additional ex-
periment where the main outcome questions on self-reported policy views were only
asked one week later in an obfuscated follow-up study hiding the connection between
the treatment provision and the main outcome questions. We find evidence of strong
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and persistent belief updating about the extent of racial labor market discrimination in
response to the information. The treatment completely eliminates the gap in beliefs
between Democrats and Republicans. Furthermore, the results from the obfuscated
follow-up study support our finding from the first experiment that self-reported attitudes
towards pro-black policies are generally unresponsive to changes in beliefs about racial
discrimination. The only exception compared to Experiment 1 is that we find some
evidence of backfiring for Republicans; that is, treated Republicans who underestimate
racial discrimination display even less support for pro-black policies.
We also ran two additional experiments to shed light on the role of two further
potential determinants of support for pro-black policies. Our first additional experiment
was motivated by strong correlational evidence suggesting an important role of beliefs
about differences in work ethic between blacks and whites for explaining views on
pro-black policies. In this experiment, we provided our respondents with information
challenging the stereotype that blacks have a worse work ethic than whites (Gilens, 2009).
Our experiment reveals that people who receive information about racial differences in
work ethic do not adjust their views on pro-black policies. Finally, after establishing that
information about racial discrimination or about racial stereotypes regarding work ethic
does not affect self-reported policy views, our last experiment sheds light on a different
prominently discussed causal determinant of policy views, namely political identity
(Bursztyn et al., 2016). We show that making party views on pro-black policies more
salient does not increase Democrat–Republican differences in self-reported policy views,
suggesting that political identity is not the main driver of people’s views on pro-black
policies. Overall, these two additional experiments corroborate our previous finding that
self-reported attitudes towards pro-black policies are generally hard to move, suggesting
that these may have an important “cultural” component that is very stable over time
(Luttmer and Singhal, 2011).
Our main contributions are as follows: We collect the first incentivized measures of
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support for pro-black policies along with quantitative and incentivized data on people’s
beliefs about racial discrimination in the labor market and in the housing market.3 We
introduce a new approach for measuring incentivized beliefs about discrimination by
leveraging correspondence studies, which provide a useful tool to elicit well-defined
and incentivized beliefs. In contrast to traditional survey questions, our approach allows
us to obtain a quantitative measure of people’s beliefs about racial discrimination that
is incentivized and easily comparable across respondents. Since incentives have been
shown to reduce partisan bias in people’s stated beliefs (Bullock et al., 2015; Prior et
al., 2015), an incentivized belief elicitation is particularly important for highly contested
issues such as racial discrimination. Our evidence on beliefs about the extent of racial
discrimination as measured in correspondence studies complements a literature studying
people’s ability to predict experimental results (DellaVigna and Pope, 2018a,b).
Second, we provide the first causal evidence of the role of people’s beliefs about
racial discrimination on their demand for policies that try to counteract the effects of this
discrimination.4 We thereby inform the debate on the determinants of support for pro-
black policies (Bobo and Kluegel, 1993; Harrison et al., 2006; Jacobson, 1985; Kluegel
and Smith, 1983; Kuklinski et al., 1997; Tuch and Hughes, 2011). More generally, by
exploring how beliefs about racial discrimination affect people’s political behavior, our
results contribute to the literate on the relevance of race for US politics (DellaVigna,
2010; Kuziemko and Washington, 2018; Stephens-Davidowitz, 2014). Moreover, our
results complement previous work on the determinants of discrimination (Bohren et al.,
2019; Burns et al., 2018; Bursztyn et al., 2017; Lowe, 2018; Rao, 2019). Our results are
also related to recent work examining whether the awareness of discrimination reduces
biased judgments (Alesina et al., 2018a; Pope et al., 2018).
3Our study is related to concurrent work by Kraus et al. (2017) who measure people’s beliefs about
racial income inequality in the US.
4More generally, we add to the broader literature on how information provision affects people’s policy
preferences (Alesina et al., 2018b; Cruces et al., 2013; Gilens, 2001; Grigorieff et al., 2016; Haaland and
Roth, 2017; Karadja et al., 2017; Kuklinski et al., 2000; Kuziemko et al., 2015).
5
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the experimental
design and samples. Section 3 provides descriptive data on people’s beliefs about racial
discrimination. Section 4 presents treatment effects of the provision of research evidence
about the extent of racial discrimination against blacks on beliefs and policy views.
Section 5 presents results from two experiments that explore the roles of beliefs about
differences in the work ethic between blacks and whites as well as political identity in
driving political differences in views on pro-black policies. Section 6 concludes. The
Online Appendix provides additional results and the full set of experimental instructions.
2 Experimental design and samples
We conducted two complementary online experiments with different samples. In Ex-
periment 1, we collected data on a probability-based sample of the US population in
collaboration with NORC at the University of Chicago. In Experiment 2, we collected
data on a US sample representative in terms of several observables, collaborating with
Research Now, a US market research company.
2.1 Experiment 1: Design
The structure of Experiment 1 is as follows (Figure 2 provides an overview). We first
measured our respondents’ beliefs about the extent of racial labor market discrimination
in the US. We then exposed half of our respondents to the information treatment. Sub-
sequently, we measured people’s support for policies to address racial discrimination
in the labor market using both self-reports and a behavioral measure. We also elicited
post-treatment beliefs about racial discrimination in the housing market.
[Insert Figure 2 and Figure 3 here]
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2.1.1 Pre-treatment beliefs about racial labor market discrimination
We used a correspondence study to measure people’s beliefs about racial discrimina-
tion in the labor market. Correspondence studies rely on fictitious resumes to study
discrimination in the labor market (Bertrand and Duflo, 2017). Specifically, by manip-
ulating whether a fictitious resume is assigned a minority name, researchers can study
racial labor market discrimination by comparing the outcomes for resumes with and
without the perceived minority name. A seminal correspondence study by Bertrand and
Mullainathan (2004) found that white-sounding names were 50 percent more likely to
receive a callback than black-sounding names; a finding that has been closely replicated
in several subsequent correspondence studies (Bertrand and Duflo, 2017; Quillian et al.,
2017). We rely on this study in our experiment. To familiarize our respondents with the
study, we presented them with the following text:
Researchers from Harvard University and the University of Chicago conducted
an experiment to study racial discrimination in the labor market. They did so
by sending out fictitious resumes to help-wanted ads in Boston and Chicago
newspapers.
The resumes were exactly the same except for one thing: the name of the job
applicant. Half of the resumes had typically white-sounding names like “Carrie”
and “Todd”. The other half of the resumes had typically black-sounding names
like “Tanisha” and “Kareem”. The idea was to make sure that the applicants
were seen as having identical qualifications, but that the employers would use
the applicants’ names to infer whether they were white or black.
We then informed respondents that resumes with white-sounding names had to be sent
out on average ten times to get one callback for an interview. To measure their beliefs
about racial discrimination in the labor market, we then asked how many times they
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believe resumes with black-sounding names had to be sent out on average to get one
callback for an interview. Furthermore, we promised respondents a $2 bonus if their
answer was the same “as what the researchers found.”
Our belief elicitation has several advantages compared to qualitative survey questions
that have traditionally been used to study beliefs about racial discrimination. First, we
measure beliefs on a quantitative scale that is easily comparable across respondents
and has the same interpretation for everyone. By contrast, many previous studies have
assessed beliefs about racial discrimination using a question from the General Social
Survey about the amount of discrimination that blacks face in “getting good jobs,” which
is measured on a 4-point scale from “none at all” to “a lot.”5 One concern with using
subjective response scales to measure beliefs is that different people may have different
opinions about what, e.g., “some” or “only a little” discrimination means.6 Furthermore,
in our setting, racial discrimination is precisely defined and we can hold our respondents’
beliefs about the circumstances of racial discrimination constant. For qualitative survey
questions, people may hold different beliefs about what constitutes “discrimination.”
These beliefs may be correlated with demographics, which makes it difficult to draw
strong conclusions on differences in beliefs about racial discrimination across demo-
graphic groups. Our measure avoids these confounds. Second, unincentivized survey
questions are more prone to the misreporting of beliefs. Indeed, small incentives for
correct answers have been shown to strongly increase the accuracy of survey responses
and to reduce gaps in reported beliefs across party lines (Bullock et al., 2015; Prior et al.,
2015). Since our question has a factual answer, we can incentivize correct responses.
5Details about this variable are available at the following link: https://gssdataexplorer.norc.
org/variables/1244/vshow (accessed November 30, 2018).
6For a discussion of problems associated with subjective response scales, see Bond and Lang (2018).
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2.1.2 Introducing exogenous variation in beliefs
Two central identification challenges when studying the impact of beliefs on policy
preferences are omitted variable bias and reverse causality. We address these identifi-
cation challenges by introducing exogenous variation in beliefs, namely by informing
respondents in the treatment group about the extent of racial discrimination found in the
study by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004). Specifically, we showed the following text
to treated respondents:
The researchers found that resumes with black-sounding names on average
had to be sent out 15 times to get one callback for an interview.
Since resumes with white-sounding names on average only had to be sent out
10 times to get one callback for an interview, this means that employers were
50 percent more likely to give callbacks to applicants with white-sounding
names compared to applicants with black-sounding names.
By contrast, respondents in the control group did not receive any information and
proceeded directly from the belief elicitation to the outcome questions.
2.1.3 Measuring support for pro-black policies: Behavioral measure
A common critique of self-reported survey questions is that they might not be reflective
of real political behavior and that they are prone to experimenter demand effects. To
address these concerns, we collected a behavioral outcome measure, namely real dona-
tions to a pro-black civil rights organization. We told our respondents that they have the
opportunity to financially support a civil rights organization that works to reduce discrim-
ination against blacks in the labor market. We elicited the respondents’ marginal rate of
substitution between money for themselves and money for the civil rights organization
through a multiple price list. The respondents chose between donating $5 to the civil
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rights organization and money for themselves in $1-increments from $0 to $5. One of
the six choices was randomly implemented.7
2.1.4 Measuring support for pro-black policies: self-reported policy views
In addition to the behavioral measure, we also collected some data on people’s self-
reported policy views. Since our treatment was tailored to shift beliefs about racial
discrimination in the labor market, we focused on labor market policies. We asked
questions about three commonly-discussed policies attempting to counteract the effects
of labor market discrimination. First, we asked respondents whether they “support or
oppose government and private programs that give qualified black candidates preference
over equally qualified white candidates in getting a job.” Second, we asked respondents
whether they “support or oppose government and private programs that give qualified
black candidates assistance in getting a job.” Third, we asked respondents whether they
“support or oppose mandatory name-blind recruitment for hiring in public and private
jobs.” For all three questions, respondents reported their answer on a 5-point scale
ranging from 1 (Strongly oppose) to 5 (Strongly support).
2.1.5 Measuring beliefs about racial discrimination in the housing market
To measure whether respondents updated their beliefs in response to the research evi-
dence, we relied on a second correspondence study that tested for racial discrimination
in the housing market (Edelman et al., 2017). We chose to focus on racial discrimination
in a different domain out of a concern that demand effects, numerical anchoring, or a
taste for consistency in survey responses could bias responses if we re-asked the question
about discrimination in the labor market shortly after the information provision. The
housing market is a good candidate for several reasons. First, racial discrimination in the
7The experiment involved no deception and we actually donated the relevant amount to the civil rights
organization after the experiment.
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housing market holds strong economic importance. Second, the study by Edelman et al.
(2017), which serves as our benchmark for incentivizing beliefs, used the same names as
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004). This allows us to easily explain the methodology to
respondents and makes the results across domains more comparable. Specifically, we
used the following text to familiarize our respondents with the second study:
Researchers from Harvard Business School conducted an experiment to study
racial discrimination in the rental market by sending out reservation requests
from invented accounts to hosts on Airbnb, a website for private rental ac-
commodations. The requests were exactly the same except for one thing: the
name of the person who sent the request. Half of the requests came from
typically white-sounding names, while the other half came from typically
black-sounding names. The idea was that the hosts would use the applicants’
name to infer whether the reservation requests came from white or black
requesters.
We then told them that the researchers found that white-sounding names were ac-
cepted 49 percent of the time. To measure their beliefs about racial discrimination in the
housing market, we then asked what percent of the time they believe that black-sounding
names were accepted. We offered a $2 bonus for answers that fall within “2 percentage
points of what the researchers found.”
We purposefully designed the second belief elicitation to avoid potential bias stem-
ming from numerical anchoring by (i) using a different response scale than the first belief
elicitation, and (ii) using a scale in which higher values implied less racial discrimination.
Since higher values implied more discrimination in the first belief elicitation, numerical
anchoring would make finding evidence for belief updating in the expected direction less
likely.
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2.2 Experiment 2: Design
While an important question is whether treatment effects persist over time, a potential
drawback of re-asking the main outcome questions in a follow-up study is that people’s
taste for consistency in their survey responses may bias treatment effects (Falk and
Zimmermann, 2013). To avoid this confound, we conducted a separate experiment in
which we only asked the main outcome questions in a follow-up study (Figure 3 provides
a summary of the structure). Furthermore, to address concerns about social desirability
bias, we obfuscated the purpose of the follow-up study.
2.2.1 Design of the first wave
We first elicited beliefs about racial discrimination in the same way as in Experiment
1. We also elicited confidence by asking respondents how sure they were on a scale
of 1 (Very Unsure) to 5 (Very Sure) of their answer to the previous question.8 Finally,
we asked respondents whether they think that racial discrimination against blacks “is a
serious problem.”
2.2.2 Design of the second wave
Approximately one week after the first wave, respondents were invited to participate in
the second wave. We chose to have one week between the two waves to strike a balance
between testing for persistence of treatment effects and minimizing attrition.
One general concern with information experiments is that the information provision
could alter participants’ perceptions about how the experimenter expects them to behave.
Even though recent evidence suggests that demand effects are not quantitatively important
(de Quidt et al., 2018; Mummolo and Peterson, 2018), we took several steps to obfuscate
8We did not ask this question in Experiment 1 owing to budget constraints. The cost of adding questions
to Experiment 1 was much higher than in Experiment 2 because it used a probability-based sample.
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the purpose of the second wave. First, respondents received a generic invitation from
the survey provider to participate in a five-minute survey which did not reveal that the
two waves were connected (Figure A.7 provides a screenshot of the invitation from wave
1).9 Second, we used different Qualtrics accounts for the two studies: in wave 1, the
Qualtrics account was from the University of Oxford; in wave 2, the Qualtrics account
was from the NHH Norwegian School of Economics. We also varied the layout of the
survey between the waves. Third, we asked respondents several obfuscation questions
about their views on investment and religion before asking our main outcome questions.
Following the obfuscation questions, we asked the same questions on self-reported
policy views as in Experiment 1: support for (i) a preference for hiring qualified black
candidates over equally qualified white candidates, (ii) assistance programs for blacks
in getting a job; and (iii) name-blind recruitment. We also asked a series of questions
to examine mechanisms. Possible mechanisms include the belief that affirmative action
programs are ineffective in improving the lives or general opportunities of blacks, which
could engender opposition to those initiatives. To examine whether the treatment affects
beliefs about the effectiveness of affirmative action, we asked respondents whether
they think that affirmative action programs over the last fifty years have “have helped
blacks, hurt them, or had no effect one way or the other.” Some people may also oppose
affirmative action because they think that differences in outcomes between blacks and
whites are mainly due to differences in work ethics between blacks and whites. To
explore whether the treatment affected beliefs about the source of inequality between
blacks and whites, we asked the following two questions: (i) to what extent they think
that differences in economic outcomes between blacks and whites are “primarily the
result of racial discrimination against blacks,” and (ii) to what extent they think that
differences in economic outcomes between blacks and whites are “primarily the result of
9The actual number of days between wave 1 and wave 2 varied between one and 19 days for all
respondents, with an average of eight days.
13
whites working harder than blacks.”
Near the end of the survey, we elicited posterior beliefs about the extent of racial
labor market discrimination using the same correspondence study as in the first wave.
As in the first wave, we incentivized correct answers with a $2 bonus. Since we use
the same belief elicitation across the two waves, it is natural to assume that respondents
realized that the two waves are connected at this point.
2.3 Sample characteristics
2.3.1 Experiment 1: NORC AmeriSpeak
For Experiment 1, we recruited 1538 respondents through NORC’s AmeriSpeak panel.10
AmeriSpeak is a probability-based panel of the US population. The panel uses NORC’s
National Frame, which is designed to provide at least 97 percent sample coverage of the
US population. The NORC National Frame is used for several landmark studies in the US,
including the General Social Survey (GSS), which is one of the most frequently-analyzed
data sets in the social sciences.11
Table A.2 provides summary statistics for this sample. 46 percent of respondents are
male, 66 percent are Non-Hispanic white, and 11 percent are Non-Hispanic black. The
median household income in our sample is $55,270. 80 percent of our sample have at
least some college education. The sample is also representative in terms of regions: 16
percent of our respondents come from the North-East, 29 percent from the Midwest, 33
percent from the South, while the remaining respondents are from the West. In terms of
10NORC does not force their respondents to answer any questions on their surveys. For some questions
we therefore have less than 1538 observations, e.g. only 1382 respondents gave an answer to the question
on the number of times resumes with black-sounding names had to be sent. There are no significant
differences between Republicans and Democrats or between blacks and whites in not responding to this
question. Our main specification includes only respondents who completed the question on beliefs about
racial discrimination.
11More information about the panel is available at the following web page: https://amerispeak.
norc.org/about-amerispeak/Pages/Panel-Design.aspx (accessed November 30, 2018).
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political affiliation, 24 percent of respondents self-identify as Republicans; 36 percent
self-identify as Democrats; 26 percent self-identify as Independents; and the remaining
14 percent do not have any particular political affiliation. Observations in the treatment
and control group are balanced in terms of observables (Table A.4).12
2.3.2 Experiment 2: Research Now
In Experiment 2, we, in collaboration with Research Now, one of the leading marketing
research companies in the US, successfully recruited 2075 respondents for the first wave
of the experiment. The first wave was the second component of a follow-up study from
another experiment that we also conducted with Research Now.13 Out of these 2075
respondents, 1720 also completed the second wave.
Table A.3 provides summary statistics for the Research Now sample. The sample
is broadly representative of the US population in terms of several important observable
characteristics: 50 percent of our respondents are male; 49 percent are non-Hispanic
white; and 6 percent are Non-Hispanic black. The median household income in our
sample is $56,000. 83 percent of our sample have at least some college education. 23
percent of our respondents come from the North-East, 19 percent from the Midwest, 35
percent from the South, and the remaining 23 percent of respondents are from the West.
In terms of political affiliation, 26 percent of respondents self-identify as Republicans,
38 percent of our respondents self-identify as Democrats, and the remaining respondents
self-identify as Independents. There is balance across treatment arms (Tables A.5 and
A.6). Treatment status is not correlated with completing the follow-up (Table A.7).
12We did not ask any questions about demographics or political affiliation as part of the experiment.
This data was appended by NORC.
13In the first wave, respondents also answered demographic questions, questions about their views on
the role of the government, and questions about their views on immigration.
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3 Beliefs about racial discrimination: Descriptives
This section uses data from Experiment 1 to provide representative evidence of people’s
beliefs about racial discrimination. We first explore heterogeneity in people’s beliefs
regarding the extent of racial discrimination in America and investigate whether these
beliefs correlate with some key background characteristics. We then examine whether
beliefs about racial discrimination correlate with people’s policy preferences.
3.1 Heterogeneity in beliefs about racial discrimination
Figure 4 provides representative evidence of people’s beliefs about racial discrimination
in the labor and housing markets. Panel A shows the cumulative distribution function
for beliefs about how many resumes with black-sounding names had to send out to
get one callback on average (respondents were told that the corresponding number for
white-sounding names was ten). This quantitative belief elicitation allows us to assess
the fraction of respondents who overestimate and underestimate racial discrimination in
society. Taking the results from Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) as given, who found
that resumes with black-sounding names needed to be sent out 15 times before receiving
one callback on average, we find that 35 percent of our respondents underestimate racial
discrimination in the labor market, 10.3 percent have correct beliefs, and the remaining
54.7 percent overestimate the extent of racial discrimination in the labor market.14
Panel B of Figure 4 shows the cumulative distribution function for beliefs about the
rejection rate of reservation requests from black-sounding names on Airbnb (respondents
were told that the corresponding number for white-sounding names was 51 percent).
Taking the results from Edelman et al. (2017) as given, who found that requests from
black-sounding names were rejected 59 percent of the time, we find that 19 percent of our
14A recent meta-analysis of field experiments on racial labor discrimination in the US shows no change
in racial discrimination over time (Quillian et al., 2017)
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respondents underestimate racial discrimination in the housing market and the remaining
81 percent overestimate the extent of racial discrimination in the housing market.
The data also allows for the measurement of the share of respondents who think that
there is discrimination against whites, discrimination against blacks, and the fraction
who think that there is no racial discrimination at all. For the labor market, 23 percent
of our respondents believe that there is discrimination against whites, nine percent
believe that there is no discrimination, and the remaining 68 percent believe that there
is discrimination against blacks. For the housing market, 12 percent think that there is
discrimination against whites, two percent believe that there is no racial discrimination,
and the remaining 86 percent think that there is discrimination against blacks. One reason
for why a higher fraction of our respondents think that there is discrimination against
blacks in the housing market might be that they think that affirmative action programs in
hiring make discrimination in the labor market less prevalent.
[Insert Figure 4 here]
Figure 5 examines whether beliefs about racial discrimination vary systematically by
people’s background characteristics. Panel A shows correlations between background
characteristics and beliefs about racial discrimination in the labor market. We find espe-
cially pronounced differences in beliefs based on people’s political affiliation: Relative
to Republicans, Democrats believe that seven additional resumes with black-sounding
names had to be sent out to get one callback on average (p<0.01). Taking the results
from Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) as given, Republicans on average overestimate
the extent of racial labor market discrimination by 16 percent, whereas Democrats over-
estimate the extent of discrimination by 71 percent. Beliefs about racial discrimination
also correlate significantly with college education and income. Relative to those with
no college education, college-educated respondents believe that four additional resumes
with black-sounding names had to be sent out to get to get one callback on average
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(p<0.01). Relative to respondents with below median income, above-median income
respondents believe that 1.7 additional resumes with black-sounding names had to be
sent out to get one callback on average (p<0.05). Surprisingly, we find no significant
differences between blacks and whites in their beliefs about discrimination in the labor
market (p=0.85).15
[Insert Figure 5 here]
Concerning beliefs about the housing market (Panel B of Figure 5), we also find
pronounced differences based on people’s political affiliation: Relative to Republicans,
Democrats think that reservation requests from black-sounding names were 5.7 percent-
age points more likely to be rejected (p<0.01). Taking the results from Edelman et al.
(2017) as given, Republicans on average overestimate housing market discrimination
by 14 percent, whereas Democrats overestimate housing market discrimination by 27
percent. While we do not find evidence of differences in beliefs in the housing market
across people with different education levels, we find significant racial differences: Rela-
tive to whites, blacks think that reservation requests from black-sounding names were
6.5 percentage points more likely to be rejected (p<0.05).
Given all of the findings discussed above, our first main result is as follows:
Result 1. The majority of Americans overestimate racial discrimination against blacks in
both the labor market and in the housing market. Furthermore, in both domains, we doc-
ument that Democrats are more likely to overestimate the extent of racial discrimination
than Republicans.
15We also elicited willingness to pay for the research evidence through a multiple price list at the end of
Experiment 2 for control group respondents. In the Online Appendix, we show that whites, males and
Republicans had a lower willingness to pay for the research evidence (Table A.10).
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3.2 The association between beliefs and policy preferences
Table 1 provides evidence of whether our measure of beliefs about racial labor discrim-
ination correlates with some of our key outcome measures using only control group
respondents. Column 1 of Panel A shows a regression of people’s actual donations to
the pro-black civil rights organization on their beliefs about racial discrimination in the
labor market. A one standard deviation increase in beliefs is associated with 0.22 of a
standard deviation higher donations to the pro-black civil rights organization (p<0.01).
This corresponds to 36 percent of the Democrat–Republican difference in donations to
the pro-black civil rights organization. Including controls in the regression reduces the
estimated association to 0.17 of a standard deviation (p<0.01, Column 1 of Panel B).
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 1 show significant associations between beliefs about
racial discrimination and support for preference in hiring and job assistance for blacks,
respectively. Column 4 shows that a one standard deviation change in beliefs about
racial discrimination in the labor market is associated with a 0.22 of a standard deviation
change in beliefs about discrimination in the housing market. Furthermore, column
5 shows that our belief measure is also predictive of whether people think that racial
discrimination against blacks in the labor market is a “serious problem.” Our next main
result is as follows.
[Insert Table 1 here]
Result 2. Beliefs about racial discrimination in the labor market are associated with
higher donations to a pro-black civil rights organization. The magnitude of a one
standard deviation change in beliefs corresponds to about 36 percent of the Democrat–
Republican difference in donations. Beliefs about racial discrimination are also positively
correlated with self-reported support for pro-black policies.
Overall, these correlations suggest that our belief measure has high external validity.
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Not only does it predict responses to qualitative survey questions, it also predicts real
donations to a pro-black civil rights organization. But naturally, these correlations need to
be interpreted cautiously. The estimated effect of beliefs on donations and self-reported
policy views could be confounded due to measurement error, reverse causality, and
omitted variable bias. The next section addresses causality by studying the effects of the
randomly assigned information treatment.
4 Treatment effects on beliefs and policy views
This section presents treatment effects from providing people with research evidence
about the results from the correspondence study by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004).
We first outline our empirical strategy and then present three sets of results: First, we
investigate whether people update their beliefs in response to the treatment. Second, we
analyze how the treatment affects people’s political behavior as measured by incentivized
donations. Third, we analyze how the treatment affects people’s self-reported policy
preferences on pro-black policies.
4.1 Empirical strategy
We pre-specified the analysis of both experiments in two documents uploaded to the
AEA RCT Registry prior to starting the data collection. The empirical strategy outlined
in this section follows the pre-analysis plans, which may be accessed with the fol-
lowing link: https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/2273. The Online
Appendix includes all pre-specified results that are not discussed in the main text.
Main specification Since we expect different treatment effects based on whether the
respondents initially overestimate or underestimate racial discrimination, our main
specification is the following difference-in-differences equation which we estimate
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using OLS:
yi = α0+α1Treatmenti+α2Treatmenti ×priori+α3priori+α4xi+ εi (1)
where yi is the outcome of interest; Treatmenti is an indicator for whether respondent i
received the research evidence; priori is an indicator for initially overestimating racial
labor market discrimination (i.e., for having pre-treatment beliefs that resumes with
black-sounding names had to be sent out more than 15 times to get one callback on
average)16; xi is a vector of pre-specified controls17; and εi is an individual-specific
error term. We use robust error terms for inference. Throughout the section, we refer to
respondents who initially underestimate and overestimate racial discrimination in the
labor market as “underestimators” and “overestimators,” respectively.
Heterogeneity by political views There are several reasons to expect Republicans to
respond differently to the information than non-Republicans. For instance, Republicans
are much more likely than non-Republicans to oppose government action on ideological
grounds.18 In the second main specification of interest, we therefore allow for politi-
cal heterogeneity in treatment responses by estimating the following triple-difference
16Since those with accurate pre-treatment beliefs (i.e., 15) should become more confident in their beliefs,
which we expected should increase support for pro-black policies, we decided to group them in the same
category as those who strictly underestimated racial discrimination.
17For Experiment 1, we include the following controls: gender (binary), age (in years), two ethnicity
indicators (non-Hispanic whites and non-Hispanic blacks); three regional indicators; household size
(continuous); log household income (continuous); an indicator for having college degree; and indicator for
being employed; and two party affiliation indicators (Republicans and Democrats). For Experiment 2, we
also include confidence in prior beliefs as a control (integer from 1 to 5) and, to follow the pre-analysis
plan, do not include an indicator for self-identifying as a Democrat.
18There are also several reasons to expect blacks to respond differently to the information than whites;
e.g., different self-interested incentives. We choose to focus on heterogeneity by political views for two
main reasons. First, there is a larger gap in racial attitudes between Republicans and Democrats than
between blacks and whites (http://pewrsr.ch/2wAjUGP; accessed February 4, 2019). Second, as there








where Republicani takes value one for respondents self-identifying as a Republican and
value zero for non-Republicans (i.e., Democrats, Independents, and respondents with no
stated political affiliation).
4.2 Do people update their beliefs about racial discrimination?
Experiment 1: Beliefs about the housing market We first examine whether people
used the information about racial discrimination in the labor market to update their beliefs
about racial discrimination in the housing market.19 Column 1 of Table 2 shows that
treated underestimators increase their estimate of the rejection rate of black-sounding
names by 4.2 percentage points (p<0.01). By contrast, treated overestimators decrease
their estimate of the rejection rate for black-sounding names by 5.8 percentage points
(p<0.01). These estimates are significantly different from each other (p<0.01). Col-
umn 2 shows that these results are virtually unaffected by including controls in the
regressions. Columns 1 and 2 of Panel B show that there is no significant treatment
heterogeneity between Republicans and non-Republicans. One reason for this could
be that we incentivized the belief elicitation, making it costly to engage in motivated
partisan reasoning.20
19While respondents were asked about the acceptance rate of black-sounding names (i.e., how many
percent of the time they thought reservation requests from black-sounding names were accepted), we
recoded the responses such that higher numbers imply more discrimination. The results show beliefs about
implied rejection rates instead.
20At the end of the survey, we asked treated respondents whether they agreed that the correspondence
study provided clear evidence of discrimination against blacks in the labor market. While only 10 percent
of our respondents actively disagree with this interpretation, Republicans are 15 percentage points more
22
Experiment 2: Posterior beliefs about the labor market In Experiment 2, we elicited
posterior beliefs about racial discrimination in the one-week follow-up. Column 3 of
Table 2 shows that treated underestimators increase their estimate of how many times
resumes with black-sounding names need to be sent out to get one callback on average by
2.3 resumes (p<0.05). Treated overestimators, by contrast, decrease their estimate by 11
resumes (p<0.01). These estimates are significantly different from each other (p<0.01).
Column 4 shows that the estimates are virtually unaffected by including controls in the
regressions. Furthermore, columns 3 and 4 of Panel B show that there is no significant
treatment heterogeneity between Republicans and non-Republicans. In Experiment 2,
we also elicited confidence in pre-treatment beliefs about racial discrimination in the
labor market. Treatment effects on posterior beliefs are stronger for respondents with
less confidence in their pre-treatment beliefs (as shown in Table A.15), consistent with
genuine belief updating.
[Insert Table 2 here]
Given all of the estimates discussed above, our next main result can be summarized
as follows:
Result 3. People’s beliefs about racial discrimination are responsive to new information.
Treated respondents strongly update their beliefs about the extent of racial discrimination
in both the labor market and the housing market in response to research evidence from a
correspondence study.
The successful “first stage” on beliefs allows us to investigate whether correcting
biases in beliefs about racial discrimination causally affects people’s behavior and policy
views on pro-black policies.
likely than non-Republicans to disagree with this interpretation.
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4.3 Does the treatment affect donations?
Table 3 shows regression results from Experiment 1 on people’s real donations to a pro-
black civil rights organization.21 In the regression, we z-score the number of donations
using the mean and standard deviation of the control group.
Column 1 of Table 3 shows that treated underestimators increase their donations
to the civil rights organization by 0.17 of a standard deviation (p<0.05).22 This effect
size corresponds to 29 percent of the Democrat–Republican difference in donations. It
also corresponds to about one-half of the difference in donations between those who
initially overestimate and underestimate racial discrimination. By contrast, treated
respondents who overestimate racial discrimination do not reduce their donations; the
treatment effect estimate is close to zero and not statistically significant, (p=0.97), even
though respondents in this group changed their beliefs about racial discrimination in the
housing market considerably. The interaction effect between pre-treatment beliefs and the
treatment is not statistically significant (p-value=0.12), but goes in the expected direction.
Column 2 shows that the estimates are virtually unaffected by including controls in the
regressions. These findings suggest that information has most scope to change behavior
for people who underestimate racial discrimination. One reason as to why overestimators
do not change their behavior could be that the treatment made them more confident that
racial discrimination against blacks is a problem, which could offset the fact that they
realize that discrimination is less prevalent than their initial estimate.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 examine political heterogeneity in treatment effects
on donations. We find no significant treatment heterogeneity based people’s political
21We only collected data on donations for respondents in Experiment 1. Respondents could choose
between varying amounts of money for themselves or donating $5 to The Lawyers’ Committee for Civil
Rights, a pro-black civil rights organization.
22A subset of respondents only completed a subset of the choices in the multiple price list. Once we
restrict the sample to respondents who made all six choices in the multiple price list, the estimated effect
sizes are virtually unchanged.
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affiliation, but generally the data are consistent with stronger treatment effects for non-
Republicans and weaker treatment effects for Republicans. Among non-Republicans,
treated underestimators increase their donations by 0.23 of a standard deviation (p<0.05),
whereas treated overestimators are essentially unaffected by the treatment; these esti-
mates are significantly different from each other (p<0.05). For Republican underesti-
mators, the treatment effect estimate is positive but close to zero and not statistically
significant (p=0.86). This estimate is also not significantly different from the effect on
non-Republican underestimators (p=0.86). For Republican overestimators, the point
estimate is positive but not statistically significant (p=0.36) and also not significantly
different from the effect on non-Republican overestimators (p=0.51). The estimated
treatment effects are essentially unchanged when we include controls (column 4).23
[Insert Table 3 here]
Although the treatment substantially narrows the Democrat–Republican gap in beliefs,
the Democrat–Republican gap in donations of about 0.6 of a standard deviation is
essentially unaffected by the treatment (p=0.93). Our fourth main result is the following:
Result 4. The provision of information about racial discrimination causally affects do-
nations to an NGO lobbying for blacks in the labor market. While the treatment strongly
increases donations for underestimators, the treatment has no effect on overestimators.
The effect for treated underestimators is entirely driven by non-Republicans, which means
that the treatment fails to narrow Democrat–Republican differences in donations.
4.4 Does the treatment affect policy views?
Table 4 shows regression results from both experiments on people’s self-reported support
for different policies to address racial discrimination in society. Columns 1–4 show
23Table A.11 shows that results are robust to using a continuous measure of people’s pre-treatment
beliefs instead of the indicator used in our main specification.
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results from Experiment 1, while columns 5–8 show results from Experiment 2. In this
section, we only report results from the main specification with controls; Table A.12
shows the corresponding results excluding controls. All outcomes are z-scored and coded
such that higher values imply higher support for the policies.
4.4.1 Experiment 1: NORC
Support for pro-black policies Columns 1 and 2 of Panel A of Table 4 show support
for two “preferential treatment” policies specifically designed to help blacks in the labor
market, namely support for giving qualified black candidates preference over equally
qualified white candidates in getting a job (column 1) and support for giving qualified
black candidates assistance in getting a job (column 2). There is essentially no impact
of the treatment on policy views on pro-black policies for either overestimators or
underestimators. Moreover, there was no significant heterogeneity between Republicans
and non-Republicans in treatment responses on these measures (as shown in Panel B).
Our next main result is as follows:
Result 5. Views on pro-black labor market policies, such as black preference in hiring
and job assistance programs for blacks, do not change in response to information about
the extent of discrimination against blacks in the labor market.
One reason for the lack of treatment effects on support for pro-black policies could be
that people have a strong ideological stance on “preferential treatment” policies, making
their support for such policies very unresponsive to changes in beliefs.
Support for name-blind recruitment We next analyze treatment effects on support
for mandatory name-blind recruitment, i.e., a “non-preferential” policy for hiring in
public and private jobs as a way to reduce discrimination in the labor market. The
outcome is closely related to our informational treatment, which advised people that
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employers used names on resumes to discriminate against blacks. From the results shown
in Column 4 of Panel A of Table 4, we see that the treatment has essentially no impact
on underestimators. Overestimators, by contrast, increase their support for name-blind
recruitment, but the estimate is not statistically significant (p=0.45).
Exploring political heterogeneity in treatment responses (Panel B of Table 4), we find
significant differences between Republicans and non-Republicans. For non-Republicans,
the treatment has a positive but non-significant impact on support for name-blind re-
cruitment among underestimators and essentially no impact among overestimators. For
Republicans, by contrast, the treatment decreases support for name-blind recruitment
by 0.24 of a standard deviation for underestimators (p=0.11) and increases support by
0.36 of a standard deviation for overestimators (p<0.05); the increased polarization in
attitudes between Republicans who underestimated and overestimated discrimination
is highly significant (p<0.01). One explanation for this finding could be that Repub-
licans have a stronger self-interested motive to oppose name-blind recruitment than
non-Republicans.24
4.4.2 Experiment 2
Support for pro-black policies Columns 5–7 of Panel A in Table 4 show treatment
effects on support for pro-black policies. While the treatment has essentially no impact on
overestimators, it “backfires” for underestimators who significantly reduce their support
for pro-black policies when they learn that discrimination was larger than they thought.
This backfire effect is entirely driven by Republicans, as shown in Panel B. Treated
Republicans who initially underestimate racial discrimination reduce their support for
pro-black policies by 0.30 of a standard deviation (p<0.01), an estimate that significantly
24One reason for why Republicans are non-Republicans might differ in their support for name-blind
recruitment could be that Republicans are more likely to be white. However, we find similar results
and even stronger evidence of polarization in attitudes between Republicans if we restrict the sample to
non-Hispanic whites. Results are available upon requests.
27
differs from the treatment effect on non-Republican underestimators (p<0.05). In
Experiment 1, we did not observe backfire effects for Republicans. One reason for this
difference could be that Republicans in Experiment 1 felt it was not socially acceptable to
express very low support for pro-black policies after being informed by the experimenter
that discrimination is more prevalent than their initial estimate. This concern does not
apply to the same extent in Experiment 2 because of the obfuscation design.
Explaining the backfire effect on support for pro-black policies One potential ex-
planation for why the treatment backfires for Republicans is that it simultaneously
changes their beliefs about how effective affirmation action programs have been in
helping blacks. Among Republicans, we find evidence of strong polarization in beliefs:
Treated republican underestimators are 0.36 of a standard deviation more likely to think
that affirmative action programs have hurt blacks (p<0.01), whereas Republican overes-
timators do not significantly change their beliefs in response to the treatment (results are
displayed in Column 1 of Table A.9). For non-Republicans, we observe no treatment
effect on beliefs about the effectiveness of affirmative action programs. While these
results could reflect genuine updating about the effectiveness of affirmative action, an
alternative explanation is that treated Republican underestimators report different beliefs
to justify their lower support for pro-black policies.
Support for name-blind recruitment Column 8 of Panel A of Table 4 shows treat-
ment effects on support for mandatory name-blind recruitment. The treatment decreases
support for name-blind recruitment among underestimators by 0.12 of a standard devia-
tion and increases support among overestimators by 0.13 of a standard deviation. While
neither effect is significantly different from zero (p=0.09 and p=0.12, respectively), the
estimates are significantly different from each other (p<0.01). In line with the evidence
from the first experiment, the negative treatment effect on underestimators is mainly
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driven by Republicans (Panel B of Table 4). While the treatment has essentially no impact
on non-Republican underestimators, it decreases support for name-blind recruitment
among Republican underestimators by 0.2 of a standard deviation (p=0.12).
[Insert Table 4 here]
5 Exploring drivers of partisan differences in policy views
Although the provision of the research evidence strongly reduces political polarization
in beliefs about racial discrimination, it does not reduce political polarization in views
on pro-black policies and donations. This finding raises the question which other
factors drive these differences. In this section, we explore the role that (i) beliefs about
differences in work ethic between whites and blacks and (ii) political identity play in
driving the partisan gap in attitudes towards pro-black policies.
5.1 Beliefs about differences in work ethic
A centuries-old negative stereotype of blacks is the belief that they are “lazy, shiftless,
and unambitious” (Gilens, 2009). One reason for why Democrats and Republicans differ
in their views on pro-black policies could be that they differ in the extent to which they
hold this negative stereotype.25
In Experiment 2, we asked respondents several questions to shed light on mechanisms,
including two questions on whether differences in economic outcomes between whites
and blacks were primarily the result of “racial discrimination against blacks” or primarily
the result of “whites working harder than blacks.” Using data from control group
respondents, we show that believing that racial inequality is due to “whites working
harder than blacks” is, by a large margin, the strongest predictor of attitudes towards
25For a formal model of stereotypes, see Bordalo et al. (2016).
29
pro-black policies (as displayed in Figure A.6). Agreeing to the statement that racial
inequalities are due to “whites working harder than blacks” is associated with a 0.87 of a
standard deviation lower support for black preference in hiring, conditional on controls
for demographics and party affiliations (p<0.01). To shed light on whether negative
stereotyping of blacks causally affects attitudes towards affirmative action policies, we
ran an additional experiment in which we challenge this stereotype with an information
intervention.
Experimental design and sample We recruited approximately 3000 American respon-
dents from Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk), an online platform commonly used in
economic experiments (Cavallo et al., 2016; Horton et al., 2011; Kuziemko et al., 2015).
We ran the experiment in October 2018 and submitted a pre-analysis plan to the same
AEA RCT Registry trial as the main experiments before we started the data collection.26
In the experiment, we first elicited people’s beliefs about which factors they think
blacks and whites rate as least important for them in a job. We then randomized respon-
dents in a treatment and control group. Respondents in the treatment group received
information that blacks and whites both rate short working hours as the least important
characteristic in a job. Respondents in the control group did not receive any informa-
tion. Subsequently, we measured people’s support for pro-black policies using the same
self-reported questions as in the main study.
Results In line with negative stereotyping of blacks (Gilens, 2009), the respondents
think that whites are 20 percent more likely than blacks to place least weight on short
working hours in a job (Table A.17). Furthermore, only 25 percent have correct beliefs
that blacks actually placed the lowest weight on short working hours. But while having
incorrect beliefs predicts greater opposition to pro-black policies, the information treat-
26Instructions are provided in Section D.4 of the Online Appendix.
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ment does not affect support for pro-black policies. The information treatment also does
not shift beliefs about whether differences in economic outcomes between blacks and
whites are “primarily the result of whites working harder than blacks,” suggesting that
the treatment is ineffective in challenging the stereotype of “lazy blacks.” Given our large
sample size, we take this as suggestive evidence that beliefs governing racial stereotypes
are much less responsive to new information than beliefs about racial discrimination.
Furthermore, this result emphasizes that views on pro-black policies are generally very
unresponsive to new information.
5.2 The role of political identity
During the last four decades, political polarization in beliefs about whether differences in
economic outcomes between blacks and whites are “mainly due to discrimination” has
strongly increased (Figure A.5; data from the General Social Survey). This shift in beliefs
is part of a broader trend in which American politics has become more polarized along
partisan lines than at any point in recent history.27 Since political identity might be a
factor that influences both beliefs and attitudes, we decided to run a further experiment to
test whether political party identity further polarizes attitudes towards pro-black policies
between Republicans and Democrats.
Experimental sample and design We recruited 4000 respondents in collaboration
with Research Now, the same market research company as used in Experiment 2. The
sample was constructed to be representative of the US population in terms of age, sex,
and region. We ran the experiment in July 2018, and we submitted a pre-analysis plan to
the same AEA RCT Registry trial as the main experiments before we started the data
collection.28
27http://www.people-press.org/2014/06/12/political-polarization-in-the-american-public,
accessed November 30, 2018.
28Instructions are provided in Section D.5 of the Online Appendix.
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We randomly assigned respondents into a control group and a treatment group. For
respondents in the treatment group, we added the following introductory sentence to
the question on whether they support affirmative action in hiring: “In contrast to the
Democratic Party, the Republican Party generally opposes all forms of special treatment
based on race.” In the main specification, we focused on the 2,737 respondents who
self-identify as either Democrats or Republicans. We hypothesized in the pre-analysis
plan that this treatment would polarize attitudes by making Democrats more supportive
of pro-black policies and Republicans less supportive.
Results The treatment has essentially no impact on attitudes for either Democrats or
Republicans (Table A.16). Given our large sample size, we take this as suggestive
evidence that political identity is not a very important driver of pro-black policies.29 This
finding underscores the point that views on pro-black policies are hard to move.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we provide novel evidence of the determinants of people’s support for
pro-black policies with a particular focus on the role of beliefs about the extent of racial
discrimination against blacks. We first provide representative evidence of people’s beliefs
about racial discrimination. We document strong heterogeneity in beliefs about the extent
of racial discrimination in society and find that people strongly update their beliefs in
response to information about the results from a correspondence study (Bertrand and
Mullainathan, 2004). However, although the treatment strongly reduces differences
in beliefs about racial discrimination between Democrats and Republicans, we do not
observe a similar convergence in support for pro-black policies used to combat racial
29While the null result could also reflect that the manipulation was too weak to substantially increase
the salience of people’s political identity, we note that a similar manipulation employed by Cappelen et al.
(2017) strongly increased political polarization in views on redistribution.
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discrimination. Almost three decades ago, Bobo and Kluegel (1993) pointed out “the need
to address the denial of contemporary racial discrimination [. . . ] if policies addressing
persistent racial inequalities are to be pursued.” Our results suggest that correcting
people’s biases in beliefs about racial discrimination is not sufficient to reduce political
differences in support for pro-black policies, and we think more work is needed to better
understand the causal drivers of the polarization in support for pro-black policies.
Our paper introduces a new approach of measuring beliefs about discrimination by
leveraging correspondence studies to measure beliefs. The advantage of this approach
is that it allows for the elicitation of quantitative and incentivized beliefs that are easily
comparable across respondents. Furthermore, this approach allows for the provision of
research evidence based on clean causal evidence. Our study demonstrates the feasibility
of this approach by showing that correspondence studies can easily be explained to and
understood by a general population sample. The approach could be useful for researchers
who wish to study beliefs about discrimination in other domains, such as discrimination
against women. Finally, the approach could be used to measure beliefs about other
resume characteristics, such as additional years of education, to measure and change
beliefs about the returns to human capital investments with credible research evidence.
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Main figures






























 Panel B: Donations to the civil rights organization
Notes: This figure uses data from Experiment 1 (the NORC sample). Panel A shows the mean of beliefs
about how many times resumes with black-sounding names on average had to be sent out to get one
callback for an interview, separately for Democrats and Republicans (the dashed line indicates the
correct answer, as found in the study by Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004). Respondents were informed
that resumes with white-sounding names on average had to be sent out ten times to get one callback on
average. Panel B shows the mean of the number of times control group respondents preferred to give
$5 to the pro-black civil rights organization over money for themselves in $1 increments from $0 to $5
for Democrats and Republicans separately. Error bars indicate the standard error of the mean.
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Figure 2: Experiment 1 (NORC sample)
Enter Experiment 1 (n=1,542)
Pre-treatment questions:
(i) Prior beliefs about racial discrimination




(i) Views on whether racial discrimination is
a “serious problem”
(ii) Views on black preference in hiring
(iii) Views on black job assistance
(iv) Views on name-blind recruitment
Incentivized outcome measures:
(i) Real donations to pro-black civil rights
organization




(i) Beliefs about the strength of the research
evidence
Figure 3: Experiment 2 (Research Now sample)
Enter Experiment 2 (n=2,073)
Pre-treatment questions:
(i) Prior beliefs about racial discrimination
(ii) Confidence in prior beliefs




(i) Views on whether racial discrimination is
a “serious problem”
Obfuscated follow-up study (n=1,720;
890/830 from treatment/control, resp.)
Questions to obfuscate follow-up purpose:
(i) Views on investments and on religion
Questions on pro-black policies:
(i) Views on black preference in hiring
(ii) Views on black job assistance
(iii) Views on name-blind recruitment
Mechanisms:
(i) Has affirmative action helped blacks?
(ii) Inequality: due to discrimination?
(iii) Inequality: due to differences in effort?
(iv) Discrimination: a “serious problem”?
Posterior beliefs:
(i) Beliefs about racial discrimination
(ii) Confidence in posterior beliefs
Willingness to pay:
(i) Willingness to pay for research evidence
(control group only)
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Beliefs about rejection rate of black-sounding names
 Panel B: Housing market discrimination
Notes: This figure uses data from Experiment 1 (the NORC sample). Panel A shows data on beliefs
about how many times resumes with black-sounding names on average had to be sent out to get one
callback for an interview. Respondents were informed that the corresponding number for resumes with
white-sounding names was ten (as found in the study by Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004). Panel B,
using only control group respondents, shows data on beliefs about the rejection rate on reservation
requests sent from accounts with black-sounding names. Respondents were initially asked about the
percent rate of acceptances of reservation requests for black-sounding names on Airbnb (true rate is 41
percent, as found in the study by Edelman et al., 2017). They were told that the corresponding number
for white-sounding names was 49. We have recoded the values to implied rejection rates by subtracting
each estimate from 100. In both panels, the short-dashed lines indicate the true level for whites and the
long-dashed lines indicate the true level for blacks.
41











-6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
N=1382











-10 -5 0 5 10
N=722
 Panel B: Housing market discrimination
Notes: This figure uses data from Experiment 1 (the NORC sample). The dots indicate the mean values
of the estimated multiple regression coefficients. The dependent variable in Panel A is people’s beliefs
about the number times resumes with black-sounding names on average had to be sent out to get one
callback for an interview. The dependent variable in Panel B is people’s beliefs about the percent




Table 1: The association between beliefs and preferences











Panel A: Without controls
Beliefs about discrimination 0.219 0.241 0.246 0.217 0.294
(0.040) (0.036) (0.035) (0.039) (0.035)
Panel B: With controls
Beliefs about discrimination 0.171 0.167 0.169 0.213 0.231
(0.041) (0.034) (0.035) (0.040) (0.031)
N 653 676 677 673 679
Note: The table show OLS regressions from control group respondents in Experiment 1 (NORC). In
Panel A, we regress the outcome indicated in each column on standardized beliefs about racial discrim-
ination in the labor market (i.e., beliefs about the number of times resumes with black-sounding names
had to be sent out to receive one callback on average). In Panel B, we also include pre-specified con-
trols in the regressions (gender, age, race, region, income, education, employment, and political views).
Donations to the NGO refers to the number of times the respondents preferred money to the pro-black
civil rights organization over money for themselves (responses range from 0 to 6). For the outcomes
Black preference (support for giving qualified black candidates preference over equally qualified white
candidates in getting a job) and Black assistance (support for giving qualified black candidates assis-
tance in getting a job), answers were given on a scale from 1 (Strongly oppose) to 5 (Strongly support).
Disc. housing refers to beliefs about the rejection rate of black-sounding names in the housing market
(elicited on a scale from 0 to 100). Disc. ser. problem refers to the question of whether “racial discrim-
ination against blacks in the labor market is a serious problem” which was elicited on a scale from 1
(Not a problem at all) to 5 (A very serious problem). All outcomes are z-scored.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 2: Belief updating
Housing market (NORC) Labor market (RN)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Main specification
Treatment (a) 4.15 4.16 2.25 2.08
(1.56) (1.54) (1.02) (1.02)
Prior × Treatment (b) -9.94 -9.91 -13.27 -13.08
(1.91) (1.90) (1.62) (1.62)
Prior 7.66 7.61 14.64 14.00
(1.54) (1.53) (1.33) (1.34)
N 1366 1366 1701 1701
Controls No Yes No Yes
Control group mean: Dependent variable 71.1 71.1 19.3 19.3
Control group mean: Prior 0.55 0.55 0.45 0.45
P-value: a + b = 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Panel B: Political heterogeneity
Treatment (a) 2.98 2.91 1.77 1.61
(1.87) (1.84) (1.22) (1.22)
Prior × Treatment (b) -9.50 -9.38 -13.18 -12.94
(2.23) (2.20) (1.89) (1.89)
Republican × Treatment (c) 3.94 4.21 1.65 1.66
(3.35) (3.34) (2.22) (2.22)
Prior × Republican × Treatment (d) 0.15 -0.22 0.07 -0.15
(4.54) (4.55) (3.71) (3.65)
Prior 6.62 6.70 14.84 14.21
(1.79) (1.76) (1.57) (1.57)
Prior × Republican 2.43 2.77 -1.18 -1.04
(3.63) (3.65) (2.97) (2.95)
Republican -5.18 -4.33 -0.86 -1.48
(2.74) (2.82) (1.47) (1.52)
N 1366 1366 1701 1701
Controls No Yes No Yes
P-value: a + b = 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
P-value: a + c = 0 0.013 0.011 0.066 0.082
P-value: b + d = 0 0.018 0.017 0.000 0.000
P-value: a + b + c + d = 0 0.388 0.383 0.000 0.000
Note: The table shows OLS regression results where the dependent variables are post-treatment
beliefs about how many percent of the time reservation requests from black-sounding names
were rejected on Airnbnb (columns 1–2; Experiment 1 with NORC) and post-treatment be-
liefs about the number of resumes with black-sounding names on average had to be sent out
to get one callback on average (columns 3–4; wave 2 of Experiment 2 with Research Now).
In even-numbered columns, we include pre-specified controls (including gender, age, race,
region, income, education, employment, and political views). “Prior” takes the value one for
respondents who overestimate the extent of racial discrimination against blacks in the labor
market (i.e., who thought pre-treatment that resumes with black-sounding names had to send
out more than 15 resumes to get one callback on average). For post-treatment beliefs about
the labor market (columns 3 and 4), we also include confidence in prior beliefs as a control.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 3: Treatment effects on donations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment (a) 0.174 0.159 0.230 0.213
(0.080) (0.075) (0.096) (0.093)
Prior × Treatment (b) -0.171 -0.139 -0.259 -0.217
(0.111) (0.107) (0.129) (0.126)
Republican -0.229 -0.365 -0.181
(0.067) (0.112) (0.112)
Prior 0.359 0.269 0.328 0.284
(0.077) (0.075) (0.089) (0.087)
Prior × Republican -0.087 -0.057
(0.174) (0.168)
Republican × Treatment (c) -0.207 -0.191
(0.160) (0.155)
Prior × Republican × Treatment (d) 0.398 0.325
(0.250) (0.243)
N 1327 1327 1327 1327
Controls No Yes No Yes
P-value: a + b = 0 0.97 0.79 0.73 0.96
P-value: a + c = 0 0.86 0.86
P-value: b + d = 0 0.51 0.61
P-value: a + b + c + d = 0 0.35 0.44
Note: The table shows OLS regression results where the dependent variable is the number of donations
to the pro-black civil rights organization (the respondents were given a multiple price list where they
could choose between money for themselves and $5 to the pro-black civil rights organization in incre-
ments of $1 from $0 to $5). The dependent variable has been z-scored using the mean and standard
deviation in the control group). In even-numbered columns, we include the following pre-specified
controls: gender, age, race (indicators for blacks and whites), regions (three indicators), household
size, income, education (indicator for having at least a two-year college degree), employment (indica-
tor for having for full-time work), and self-reported political affiliation (indicators for Republicans
and Democrats). “Prior” takes the value one for respondents who overestimate the extent of racial
discrimination against blacks in the labor market (i.e., who thought pre-treatment that resumes with
black-sounding names had to send out more than 15 resumes to get one callback on average).
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
45
Table 4: Treatment effects on policy preferences
Experiment 1 (NORC) Experiment 2 (Research Now)

















Panel A: Main specification
Treatment (a) 0.011 -0.028 -0.015 -0.025 -0.124 -0.081 -0.136 -0.121
(0.076) (0.070) (0.077) (0.071) (0.064) (0.059) (0.062) (0.059)
Prior × Treatment (b) 0.079 -0.037 0.059 0.010 0.255 0.071 0.137 0.116
(0.101) (0.094) (0.099) (0.094) (0.094) (0.087) (0.093) (0.088)
Prior 0.086 0.194 0.234 0.237 -0.009 -0.077 0.089 0.002
(0.073) (0.068) (0.071) (0.067) (0.066) (0.063) (0.065) (0.063)
N 1378 1377 1374 1371 1720 1720 1720 1720
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
P-value: a + b = 0 0.18 0.30 0.49 0.81 0.06 0.88 0.98 0.94
Panel B: Political hetereogeneity
Treatment (a) 0.114 -0.061 -0.072 -0.074 -0.088 -0.015 -0.056 -0.039
(0.089) (0.084) (0.091) (0.087) (0.077) (0.069) (0.071) (0.068)
Prior × Treatment (b) -0.079 -0.074 0.037 -0.024 0.209 -0.035 0.012 -0.014
(0.115) (0.109) (0.112) (0.109) (0.109) (0.101) (0.104) (0.100)
Republican × Treatment (c) -0.350 0.109 0.192 0.166 -0.114 -0.223 -0.268 -0.276
(0.172) (0.150) (0.172) (0.149) (0.141) (0.136) (0.143) (0.138)
Prior × Republican × Treatment (d) 0.666 0.275 0.251 0.298 0.162 0.404 0.471 0.493
(0.244) (0.214) (0.253) (0.221) (0.219) (0.204) (0.229) (0.211)
Prior 0.215 0.214 0.273 0.270 0.099 0.018 0.215 0.125
(0.082) (0.079) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.073) (0.073) (0.072)
Prior × Republican -0.542 -0.148 -0.250 -0.219 -0.414 -0.361 -0.482 -0.473
(0.175) (0.152) (0.190) (0.165) (0.153) (0.140) (0.160) (0.146)
Republican 0.120 -0.320 -0.251 -0.323 -0.043 -0.237 -0.192 -0.244
(0.125) (0.112) (0.123) (0.107) (0.094) (0.093) (0.093) (0.092)
N 1378 1377 1374 1371 1720 1720 1720 1720
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
P-value: a + b = 0 0.64 0.06 0.60 0.15 0.12 0.50 0.56 0.46
P-value: a + c = 0 0.11 0.70 0.41 0.45 0.09 0.04 0.01 0.01
P-value: b + d = 0 0.01 0.27 0.20 0.15 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.01
P-value: a + b + c + d = 0 0.03 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.26 0.33 0.33 0.25
Note: The table shows OLS regression results. The dependent variables are indicated in each column. In columns 1–4, we present results from Exper-
iment 1; in columns 5–8, we present results from Experiment 2 (wave 2). For the outcomes Name-blind recruitment (support for mandatory name-
blind recruitment), Black preference (support for giving qualified black candidates preference over equally qualified white candidates in getting a
job), and Black assistance (support for giving qualified black candidates assistance in getting a job), answers were given on a scale from 1 (Strongly
oppose) to 5 (Strongly support). These outcome are z-scored using the mean and standard deviation in the control group. Problack (index) is the
mean of Black preference and Black assistance; this index was pre-specified. Prior takes the value one for respondents who overestimate the extent
of racial discrimination against blacks in the labor market. We include pre-specified controls in all regressions (the controls are listed in Table 2).
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Online Appendix:
Beliefs About Racial Discrimination and
Support for Pro-Black Policies
Ingar Haaland and Christopher Roth
Summary of the Online Appendix
Section A provides all the appendix tables. Section A.1 provides an overview of all
experiments, summary statistics for Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, as well as evidence
of covariate balance and results on attrition. Section A.2 provides treatment effects
on some mechanisms questions. Section A.3 provides additional results on robustness
and heterogeneity of treatment effects. Section A.4 shows treatment effects from the
two additional experiments (Experiment 3 and Experiment 4). Section A.5 provides
additional pre-specified tables. Section B provides all the appendix figures. Section C
provides screenshots of the consent forms for Experiment 2 and the recruitment email




A.1 Overview, summary statistics, balance and attrition
Table A.1: Overview of experiments























































Notes: This table provides an overview of the different experiments conducted.
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Table A.2: Summary statistics: Experiment 1 (NORC)
Mean SD Median Min. Max. Obs.
Respondent age 48.52 16.79 49.00 18.00 92.00 1542
Male 0.46 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 1542
Non-Hispanic black 0.11 0.31 0.00 0.00 1.00 1542
Non-Hispanic white 0.66 0.47 1.00 0.00 1.00 1542
Northeast 0.16 0.36 0.00 0.00 1.00 1542
Midwest 0.29 0.45 0.00 0.00 1.00 1542
South 0.33 0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00 1542
Household size 2.69 1.42 2.00 1.00 6.00 1542
Log household income 10.81 0.86 10.92 7.82 12.27 1542
At least some college 0.80 0.40 1.00 0.00 1.00 1542
Paid employee 0.51 0.50 1.00 0.00 1.00 1542
Self-employed 0.10 0.31 0.00 0.00 1.00 1542
Prior (dummy) 0.55 0.50 1.00 0.00 1.00 1382
Prior (continuous) 22.46 21.15 20.00 1.00 100.00 1382
Republican 0.24 0.43 0.00 0.00 1.00 1542
Democrat 0.36 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00 1542
Notes: This table displays summary statistics for Experiment 1 (NORC). “Prior (dummy)” takes
the value one for respondents who overestimate racial discrimination in the labor market. “Prior
(continuous)” refers to the number of times the respondents thought resumes with black-sounding
names had to be sent out to get one callback on average.
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Table A.3: Summary statistics: Experiment 2 (Research Now)
Mean SD Median Min. Max. Obs.
Respondent age 47.43 15.53 49.50 21.00 69.50 2073
Male 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 2073
Non-Hispanic black 0.06 0.24 0.00 0.00 1.00 2073
Non-Hispanic white 0.49 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 2073
Household size 2.46 1.35 2.00 0.00 10.00 2073
Log household income 10.93 0.83 11.04 8.92 12.32 2073
At least 2-year college degree 0.83 0.38 1.00 0.00 1.00 2073
Prior (dummy) 0.46 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 2073
Prior (continuous) 18.74 19.91 15.00 1.00 100.00 2073
Confidence in prior 3.34 1.00 3.00 1.00 5.00 2073
Republican 0.26 0.44 0.00 0.00 1.00 2073
Democrat 0.38 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00 2073
West 0.23 0.42 0.00 0.00 1.00 2073
South 0.35 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00 2073
Northeast 0.23 0.42 0.00 0.00 1.00 2073
Midwest 0.19 0.39 0.00 0.00 1.00 2073
Notes: This table displays summary statistics for Experiment 2 (Research Now). “Prior (dummy)”
takes the value one for respondents who overestimate racial discrimination in the labor market.
“‘Confidence in prior” (i.e., confidence in the answer to the question of how many times resumes with
black-sounding names had to be sent out to get one callback on average) was elicited on a scale from
1 (Very unsure) to 5 (Very Sure).
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Table A.4: Balance: Experiment 1 (NORC)
Treatment (T) Control (C) P-value(T - C) Observations
Respondent age 49.31 47.71 0.062 1542
Male 0.45 0.48 0.258 1542
Non-Hispanic black 0.11 0.11 0.767 1542
Non-Hispanic white 0.67 0.65 0.514 1542
Northeast 0.16 0.15 0.713 1542
Midwest 0.26 0.31 0.033 1542
South 0.34 0.32 0.586 1542
Household size 2.66 2.73 0.308 1542
Log household income 10.84 10.79 0.214 1542
At least some college 0.82 0.78 0.032 1542
Paid employee 0.52 0.50 0.316 1542
Self-employed 0.10 0.11 0.708 1542
Prior (dummy) 0.54 0.55 0.708 1382
Republican 0.23 0.24 0.825 1542
Democrat 0.36 0.35 0.734 1542
Notes: This table displays covariate means for the treatment and control group for Experiment 1
(NORC). “Prior (dummy)” takes the value one for respondents who overestimate racial discrimination
in the labor market. The p-value of a joint F-test of a regression of the treatment indicator on all of
the covariates is p=0.164.
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Table A.5: Balance: Experiment 2 (Research Now; baseline survey)
Treatment (T) Control (C) P-value(T - C) Observations
Respondent age 47.19 47.66 0.493 2073
Male 0.50 0.49 0.844 2073
Non-Hispanic black 0.06 0.05 0.335 2073
Non-Hispanic white 0.49 0.48 0.812 2073
Household size 2.42 2.50 0.228 2073
Log household income 10.92 10.94 0.691 2073
At least 2-year college degree 0.83 0.82 0.609 2073
Prior (dummy) 0.47 0.45 0.350 2073
Confidence in prior 3.31 3.36 0.295 2073
Republican 0.25 0.26 0.643 2073
Democrat 0.38 0.37 0.799 2073
West 0.22 0.24 0.225 2073
South 0.35 0.35 0.947 2073
Northeast 0.24 0.22 0.281 2073
Midwest 0.19 0.19 0.940 2073
Notes: This table displays covariate means for the treatment and control group (wave 1 of Experiment
2 with Research Now). “Prior (dummy)” takes the value one for respondents who overestimate
racial discrimination in the labor market. “‘Confidence in prior” (i.e., confidence in the answer to
the question of how many times resumes with black-sounding names had to be sent out to get one
callback on average) was elicited on a scale from 1 (Very unsure) to 5 (Very Sure). The p-value of a
joint F-test of a regression of the treatment indicator on all of the covariates is p=0.918.
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Table A.6: Balance: Experiment 2 (Research Now; obfuscated follow-up)
Treatment (T) Control (C) P-value(T - C) Observations
Respondent age 47.48 48.05 0.449 1671
Male 0.51 0.51 0.990 1671
Non-Hispanic black 0.07 0.06 0.419 1671
Non-Hispanic white 0.49 0.48 0.863 1671
Household size 2.43 2.46 0.640 1671
Log household income 10.92 10.94 0.716 1671
At least 2-year college degree 0.82 0.82 0.987 1671
Prior (dummy) 0.47 0.45 0.357 1670
Confidence in prior 3.32 3.38 0.218 1670
Republican 0.25 0.27 0.449 1671
Democrat 0.39 0.38 0.642 1671
West 0.22 0.25 0.313 1671
South 0.34 0.35 0.717 1671
Northeast 0.25 0.22 0.286 1671
Midwest 0.19 0.18 0.707 1671
Notes: This table displays covariate means for the treatment and control group (wave 2 of Experiment
2 with Research Now). “Prior (dummy)” takes the value one for respondents who overestimate
racial discrimination in the labor market. “‘Confidence in prior” (i.e., confidence in the answer to
the question of how many times resumes with black-sounding names had to be sent out to get one
callback on average) was elicited on a scale from 1 (Very unsure) to 5 (Very Sure). The p-value of a
joint F-test of a regression of the treatment indicator on all of the covariates is p=0.961.
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Response rate 0.806 0.806
Observations 2073 2073
Notes: The outcome variables takes value one if our respondent com-
pleted the follow-up study (wave 2 of Experiment 2 with Research Now).
“Treatment” takes value one if the respondent received information about
the results from the correspondence study. “Prior (dummy)” takes the
value one for respondents who overestimate racial discrimination in the
labor market. “‘Confidence in prior” (i.e., confidence in the answer to
the question of how many times resumes with black-sounding names
had to be sent out to get one callback on average) was elicited on a scale
from 1 (Very unsure) to 5 (Very Sure). * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.8
A.2 Mechanisms
Table A.8: Treatment effects: Views on whether discrimination is a “seri-
ous problem”
Experiment 1 (NORC) Experiment 2 (RN)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Main specification
Treatment (a) 0.178 0.157 0.127 0.108
(0.083) (0.072) (0.062) (0.056)
Prior × Treatment (b) -0.046 -0.019 -0.017 -0.001
(0.105) (0.092) (0.086) (0.078)
Prior 0.429 0.302 0.326 0.325
(0.076) (0.067) (0.060) (0.055)
N 1379 1379 2073 2073
Controls No Yes No Yes
P-value: a + b = 0 0.040 0.016 0.061 0.049
Panel B: Political heterogeneity
Treatment (a) 0.170 0.141 0.197 0.189
(0.099) (0.090) (0.070) (0.066)
Prior × Treatment (b) -0.092 -0.042 -0.082 -0.083
(0.119) (0.109) (0.095) (0.090)
Republican × Treatment (c) 0.010 0.051 -0.257 -0.280
(0.156) (0.147) (0.135) (0.127)
Republican × Prior × Treatment (d) 0.283 0.166 0.207 0.283
(0.221) (0.212) (0.189) (0.178)
N 1379 1379 2073 2073
Controls No Yes No Yes
P-value: a + b = 0 0.242 0.113 0.070 0.090
P-value: a + c = 0 0.137 0.098 0.602 0.403
P-value: b + d = 0 0.303 0.496 0.444 0.191
P-value: a + b + c + d = 0 0.009 0.024 0.575 0.310
Note: The table shows OLS regression results where the dependent variable is agree-
ment to the statement that “racial disagreement against blacks in the labor market is
a serious problem.” Columns 1 and 2 show responses from Experiment 1 (NORC),
whereas columns 3 and 4 show responses from the first wave of Experiment 2 (Re-
search Now). In both experiments, answers were given from a scale from 1 (Not a
problem at all to) to 5 (A very serious problem). The outcome has been z-scored by
the mean and standard deviation of the control group. “Prior” takes the value one for
respondents who overestimate the extent of racial discrimination against blacks in
the labor market. Even-numbered columns include pre-specified controls (as listed
in Table 2).
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
9
Table A.9: Experiment 2: Treatment effects – mechanism questions









Panel A: Main specification
Treatment (a) 0.054 0.015 0.048 -0.022
(0.066) (0.061) (0.062) (0.063)
Prior × Treatment (b) -0.083 -0.121 -0.081 0.189
(0.095) (0.087) (0.090) (0.089)
Prior 0.022 -0.080 0.465 0.105
(0.067) (0.062) (0.064) (0.063)
N 1720 1719 1715 1715
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
P-value: a + b = 0 0.669 0.087 0.607 0.008
Panel B: Political heterogeneity
Treatment (a) -0.076 -0.046 0.089 0.017
(0.074) (0.071) (0.076) (0.076)
Prior × Treatment (b) 0.080 0.003 -0.099 0.081
(0.104) (0.100) (0.104) (0.105)
Republican × Treatment (c) 0.441 0.205 -0.137 -0.131
(0.155) (0.139) (0.132) (0.134)
Republican × Prior × Treatment (d) -0.592 -0.488 0.032 0.440
(0.240) (0.204) (0.211) (0.194)
N 1720 1719 1715 1715
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
P-value: a + b = 0 0.953 0.543 0.891 0.182
P-value: a + c = 0 0.007 0.184 0.664 0.302
P-value: b + d = 0 0.018 0.006 0.716 0.001
P-value: a + b + c + d = 0 0.383 0.013 0.442 0.001
Note: The table shows OLS regression results where the dependent variables are indicated in each col-
umn. Responses were elicited in the second wave of Experiment 2 (the obfuscated follow-up study).
Affirmative action hurts refers to the question of whether “affirmative action programs for the past
fifty years have helped blacks blacks” which was elicited on a scale from 1 (Strongly helped) to 7
(Strongly hurt). Inequality due to effort refers to the question of whether “differences in economic
outcomes between whites and blacks are primarily the result of racial discrimination against blacks”
which was elicited on a scale from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 7 (Strongly agree). Inequality due to
disc. refers to the question of whether “differences in economic outcomes between whites and blacks
are primarily the result of whites working harder than blacks” which was elicited on scale from 1
(Strongly disagree) to 7 (Strongly agree). Disc. ser. problem refers to the question of whether “racial
discrimination against blacks in the labor market is a serious problem” which was elicited on a scale
from 1 (Not a problem at all) to 5 (A very serious problem). All responses are z-scored using the mean
and the standard deviation of the control group. Controls include gender, age, race, region, income,
education, employment, political views, and confidence in prior beliefs. Prior takes the value one for
respondents who overestimate the extent of racial discrimination against blacks in the labor market.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Notes: The table show OLS regressions using control group respon-
dents from Experiment 2 (Research Now). We offered control group
respondents the option to buy information about the results from the
correspondence study by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004). Willingness
to pay to receive the information was elicited using a multiple price list
where respondents could choose between receiving the information or
varying amounts for themselves (between 10 cents and $1). “Willingness
to pay” is the number of times individuals prefer to receive information
over receiving money (on a scale from 0 to 7). Column 1 shows the raw
score, whereas column 2 shows the z-score (standardized using the mean
and standard deviation of the responses). “Prior” takes the value one for
respondents who overestimate the extent of racial discrimination against
blacks in the labor market. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust
standard errors in parentheses.
11
A.3 Robustness and additional heterogeneity
Table A.11: Treatment effects on donations: Robustness with continuous prior
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment 0.256 0.246 0.325 0.300
(0.092) (0.089) (0.110) (0.107)
Prior × Treatment -0.009 -0.009 -0.012 -0.010
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Prior 0.015 0.012 0.015 0.013
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Republican -0.232 -0.293 -0.115
(0.067) (0.133) (0.134)
Prior × Republican -0.006 -0.005
(0.007) (0.007)
Republican × Treatment -0.263 -0.224
(0.193) (0.190)
Prior × Republican × Treatment 0.013 0.010
(0.010) (0.010)
N 1327 1327 1327 1327
Controls No Yes No Yes
Note: The table shows OLS regression results where the dependent variable is the number of donations
to the pro-black civil rights organization (the respondents were given a multiple price list where they
could choose between money for themselves and $5 to the pro-black civil rights organization in $1
increments from $0 to $5). The dependent variable has been z-scored using the mean and standard
deviation in the control group. In even-numbered columns, we include the following pre-specified
controls: gender, age, race (indicators for blacks and whites), regions (three indicators), household
size, income, education (indicator for having at least a two-year college degree), employment (indica-
tor for having for full-time work), and self-reported political affiliation (indicators for Republicans
and Democrats). “Prior” refers beliefs about the number of times resumes with black-sounding names
had to be sent out to get one callback on average (the question was elicited on a scale from 1 to 100,
and in line with the pre-analysis plan we have top-coded responses at 50).
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table A.12: Treatment effects on policy preferences: Results without controls
Experiment 1 (NORC) Experiment 2 (Research Now)

















Panel A: Main specification
Treatment (a) 0.028 -0.015 0.010 -0.004 -0.101 -0.047 -0.102 -0.083
(0.079) (0.077) (0.082) (0.079) (0.066) (0.066) (0.065) (0.066)
Prior × Treatment (b) 0.058 -0.072 0.029 -0.026 0.224 0.018 0.088 0.057
(0.106) (0.104) (0.106) (0.104) (0.098) (0.096) (0.098) (0.096)
Prior 0.170 0.304 0.354 0.367 -0.008 -0.095 0.107 0.000
(0.076) (0.075) (0.075) (0.075) (0.068) (0.067) (0.068) (0.068)
N 1378 1377 1374 1371 1720 1720 1720 1720
Controls No No No No No No No No
P-value: a + b = 0 0.22 0.21 0.57 0.66 0.091 0.67 0.84 0.72
Panel B: Political hetereogeneity
Treatment (a) 0.145 -0.038 -0.037 -0.042 -0.071 0.009 -0.034 -0.013
(0.092) (0.092) (0.096) (0.095) (0.078) (0.075) (0.074) (0.073)
Prior × Treatment (b) -0.130 -0.129 -0.014 -0.085 0.193 -0.062 -0.017 -0.046
(0.120) (0.119) (0.119) (0.119) (0.112) (0.106) (0.107) (0.105)
Republican × Treatment (c) -0.406 0.065 0.154 0.121 -0.118 -0.231 -0.267 -0.280
(0.174) (0.154) (0.175) (0.154) (0.144) (0.148) (0.148) (0.149)
Republican × Prior × Treatment (d) 0.803 0.374 0.339 0.406 0.133 0.346 0.440 0.441
(0.248) (0.223) (0.258) (0.230) (0.227) (0.219) (0.234) (0.224)
N 1378 1377 1374 1371 1720 1720 1720 1720
Controls No No No No No No No No
P-value: a + b = 0 0.844 0.027 0.460 0.078 0.130 0.481 0.502 0.429
P-value: a + c = 0 0.077 0.824 0.427 0.520 0.115 0.082 0.019 0.024
P-value: b + d = 0 0.002 0.193 0.155 0.103 0.100 0.140 0.043 0.046
P-value: a + b + c + d = 0 0.010 0.056 0.012 0.010 0.387 0.667 0.458 0.496
Note: The table shows OLS regression results. The dependent variables are indicated in each column. In columns 1–4, we present results from Ex-
periment 1; in columns 5–8, we present results from Experiment 2. For the outcomes Name-blind recruitment (support for mandatory name-blind
recruitment), Black preference (support for giving qualified black candidates preference over equally qualified white candidates in getting a job), and
Black assistance (support for giving qualified black candidates assistance in getting a job), answers were given on a scale from 1 (Strongly oppose)
to 5 (Strongly support). These outcome are z-scored using the mean and standard deviation in the control group. Problack (index) is the mean of
Black preference and Black assistance; this index was pre-specified. Prior takes the value one for respondents who overestimate the extent of racial
discrimination against blacks in the labor market.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table A.13: Treatment effects on policy preferences: Results with continuous prior
Experiment 1 (NORC) Experiment 2 (Research Now)

















Panel A: Main specification
Treatment 0.044 0.090 0.055 0.081 -0.136 -0.109 -0.153 -0.147
(0.088) (0.080) (0.087) (0.081) (0.074) (0.070) (0.072) (0.070)
Prior × Treatment 0.000 -0.007 -0.002 -0.006 0.008 0.004 0.005 0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Prior 0.007 0.012 0.012 0.014 0.001 -0.002 0.004 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
N 1378 1377 1374 1371 1720 1720 1720 1720
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Political hetereogeneity
Treatment 0.130 0.032 -0.039 -0.003 -0.113 -0.033 -0.069 -0.057
(0.100) (0.095) (0.100) (0.096) (0.087) (0.080) (0.082) (0.080)
Prior × Treatment -0.003 -0.007 -0.001 -0.005 0.007 0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Republican × Treatment -0.356 0.175 0.290 0.258 -0.064 -0.280 -0.320 -0.338
(0.207) (0.177) (0.210) (0.179) (0.169) (0.160) (0.171) (0.165)
Prior × Republican × Treatment 0.018 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.015 0.016 0.017
(0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
N 1378 1377 1374 1371 1720 1720 1720 1720
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: The table shows OLS regression results. The dependent variables are indicated in each column. In columns 1–4, we present results from
Experiment 1; in columns 5–8, we present results from Experiment 2. For the outcomes Name-blind recruitment (support for mandatory
name-blind recruitment), Black preference (support for giving qualified black candidates preference over equally qualified white candidates in
getting a job), and Black assistance (support for giving qualified black candidates assistance in getting a job), answers were given on a scale
from 1 (Strongly oppose) to 5 (Strongly support). These outcome are z-scored using the mean and standard deviation in the control group.
Problack (index) is the mean of Black preference and Black assistance; this index was pre-specified. Prior’ refers beliefs about the number of
times resumes with black-sounding names had to be sent out to get one callback on average (the question was elicited on a scale from 1 to 100,
and in line with the pre-analysis plan we have top-coded responses at 50).
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table A.14: Treatment effects with probability weights (Experiment 1; NORC)













Panel A: Man specification
Treatment (a) 2.413 0.158 0.065 0.020 -0.009 0.231
(2.087) (0.180) (0.099) (0.101) (0.108) (0.114)
Prior × Treatment (b) -7.313 -0.001 -0.021 -0.064 0.099 -0.081
(2.523) (0.252) (0.134) (0.132) (0.134) (0.148)
Prior 5.157 0.290 0.070 0.124 0.096 0.260
(1.925) (0.177) (0.093) (0.087) (0.096) (0.103)
N 1366 1327 1378 1377 1374 1379
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control group mean 71.69 1.93 3.47 2.70 3.41 3.18
P-value: a + b = 0 0.000 0.371 0.627 0.598 0.280 0.100
Panel B: Political heterogeneity
Treatment (a) 1.515 0.212 0.234 -0.009 -0.134 0.243
(2.418) (0.222) (0.111) (0.117) (0.125) (0.141)
Prior × Treatment (b) -7.022 -0.145 -0.295 -0.079 0.115 -0.158
(2.811) (0.296) (0.149) (0.150) (0.151) (0.176)
Republican × Treatment (c) 3.035 -0.184 -0.579 0.097 0.422 -0.048
(4.769) (0.368) (0.230) (0.230) (0.232) (0.237)
Republican × Prior × Treatment (d) -0.017 0.655 1.145 0.129 0.148 0.376
(6.354) (0.579) (0.331) (0.302) (0.332) (0.327)
N 1366 1327 1378 1377 1374 1379
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
P-value: a + b = 0 0.000 0.732 0.536 0.367 0.830 0.393
P-value: a + c = 0 0.269 0.925 0.086 0.658 0.146 0.304
P-value: b + d = 0 0.219 0.306 0.004 0.849 0.370 0.431
P-value: a + b + c + d = 0 0.521 0.180 0.020 0.401 0.010 0.034
Note: The table shows OLS regressions with probability weights where the dependent variable is indicated in each
column (applying probability weights was not pre-specified). Disc. housing refers to beliefs about the rejection
rate of black-sounding names in the housing market (elicited on a scale from 0 to 100). Donations to the NGO
refers to the number of times the respondents preferred money to the pro-black civil rights organization over money
for themselves (responses range from 0 to 6). For the outcomes Name-blind recruitment (support for mandatory
name-blind recruitment), Black preference (support for giving qualified black candidates preference over equally
qualified white candidates in getting a job), and Black assistance (support for giving qualified black candidates
assistance in getting a job), answers were given on a scale from 1: “Strongly oppose” to 5: “Strongly support.”
Disc. ser. problem refers to the question of whether “racial discrimination against blacks in the labor market is a
serious problem” which was elicited on a scale from 1 (Not a problem at all) to 5 (A very serious problem). The
outcomes in columns 2–6 are z-scored using the mean and standard deviation in the control group. Controls are
listed in Table 3. Prior takes the value one for respondents who overestimate the extent of racial discrimination
against blacks in the labor market.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table A.15: Belief updating: Heterogeneity by confidence in prior beliefs
Labor market
(1) (2)
Panel A: Main specification
Treatment 2.25 2.10
(1.02) (1.02)






Panel B: Heterogeneity by confidence
Treatment 11.20 11.94
(4.17) (4.12)
Prior × Treatment -22.85 -23.35
(6.23) (6.13)
Confidence × Treatment -2.63 -2.89
(1.22) (1.20)











Note: The table shows OLS regression results where the dependent variable is post-treatment beliefs
about the number of resumes with black-sounding names on average had to be sent out to get one call-
back on average (wave 2 of Experiment 2 with Research Now). In column 2, we include pre-specified
controls (including gender, age, race, region, income, education, employment, and political views).
“Prior” takes the value one for respondents who overestimate the extent of racial discrimination against
blacks in the labor market (i.e., who thought pre-treatment that resumes with black-sounding names
had to send out more than 15 resumes to get one callback on average). “Confidence” refers to confi-
dence in pre-treatment beliefs (measured instantly after the belief elicitation) and was elicited on a
scale from 1 (Very unsure) to 5 (Very sure).
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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A.4 Results from follow-up experiments
Table A.16: Experiment 3: Treatment effects of a political party prime
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment 0.04 0.03 -0.04 -0.03
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Republicans -0.61 -0.61 -0.20 -0.17
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Treatment × Republicans -0.06 -0.03 0.02 0.03
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Democrats 0.41 0.44
(0.05) (0.05)
Treatment × Democrats 0.08 0.06
(0.07) (0.07)
N 2737 2737 4000 4000
Controls No Yes No Yes
Note: The table shows OLS regressions from Experiment 3 (Research Now). The dependent variable
is support for “government and private programs that give qualified black and other racial minor-
ity candidates preference over equally qualified white candidates in getting a job.” Answers were
given on a scale from 1 (Strongly oppose) to 5 (Strongly support). We have z-scored the responses
by the mean and standard deviation in the control group. The treatment was a political party prime,
where we reminded respondents about party views on affirmative action as follows: “In contrast to
the Democratic Party, the Republican Party generally opposes all forms of special treatment based on
race.” In even-numbered columns, we include the following pre-specified controls: gender, age, and
education. In line with the pre-analysis, we exclude Independents from the regression in columns 1–2
as the treatment was tailored to affect attitudes for Republicans and Democrats. In columns 3–4, add
interaction terms between the treatment and Democrats and add Independents to the regressions. The
sample was recruited from Research Now and is representative of the US population on the following
observable characteristics: age, sex, and region.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table A.17: Experiment 4: Treatment effects of information about racial stereotypes









Panel A: Main specification
Treatment -0.001 0.012 0.006 0.040
(0.032) (0.033) (0.028) (0.032)
Panel B: Heterogeneity
Treatment (a) 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.04
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Prior × Treatment (b) -0.09 -0.06 -0.07 0.01
(0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07)
Prior 0.18 0.11 0.15 -0.13
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
N 2999 2999 2999 2999
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
P-value: a + b = 0 0.29 0.61 0.37 0.43
Note: The table shows OLS regression results from Experiment 4 (MTurk). The dependent variables
are indicated in each column. For the outcomes Black preference (support for giving qualified black
candidates preference over equally qualified white candidates in getting a job) and Black assistance
(support for giving qualified black candidates assistance in getting a job), answers were given on a
scale from 1: “Strongly oppose” to 5: “Strongly support.” These outcome are z-scored using the mean
and standard deviation in the control group. Problack (index) is the mean of Black preference and
Black assistance; this index was pre-specified. For the outcome “Inequality: effort” (agreement to
the statement that differences in economic outcomes between blacks and whites are due to whites
working harder than blacks), answers were given on a scale from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 7 (Strongly
agree) and then z-scored. Prior is indicator taking the value one for respondents who thought that
blacks were most likely to rank “Working hours are short, lots of free time” as the least important
characteristic in a job. Controls were pre-specified and include the prior, two racial indicators (black
and white), a gender indicator, a college indicator, age, log income, and two indicators for political
status (Democrats and Republicans).
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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A.5 Additional pre-specified tables
Table A.18: Pre-specified regressions: Experiment 1 (NORC)
Racial discrimination Preference Assistance Pro-black Name-blind Racial discrimination: Donation
is a serious problem for blacks for blacks policy index screening housing market NGO
Panel A: Main Effect
Treatment 0.147 -0.049 0.019 -0.015 0.054 -0.065 0.082
(0.045) (0.047) (0.050) (0.042) (0.050) (0.047) (0.053)
[1.000] [1.000]
Observations 1379 1377 1374 1371 1378 1366 1327
Panel B: Prior
Treatment × (A) -0.019 -0.037 0.057 0.009 0.080 -0.501 -0.137
Prior > 15 (0.092) (0.094) (0.099) (0.084) (0.101) (0.096) (0.107)
Treatment (B) 0.157 -0.029 -0.012 -0.020 0.010 0.210 0.157
(0.072) (0.070) (0.078) (0.064) (0.076) (0.078) (0.076)
Pr(A+B)=0 0.016 0.299 0.474 0.842 0.178 0.000 0.790
Observations 1379 1377 1374 1371 1378 1366 1327
Panel C: Republican
Treatment × 0.126 0.238 0.289 0.265 -0.051 0.285 -0.016
Republican (A) (0.103) (0.106) (0.124) (0.097) (0.123) (0.115) (0.118)
Treatment (B) 0.118 -0.104 -0.048 -0.077 0.066 -0.131 0.086
(0.052) (0.055) (0.055) (0.048) (0.057) (0.053) (0.062)
Pr(A+B)=0 0.006 0.143 0.031 0.026 0.894 0.133 0.489
Observations 1379 1377 1374 1371 1378 1366 1327
Notes: For the outcome Racial discrimination serious problem, answers were given from a scale from 1: “Not a problem”
at all to 5: “A very serious problem”. For the outcomes Support preference for blacks, Support assistance for blacks,
and Support name-blind recruitment, answers were given on a scale from 1: “Strongly oppose” to 5: “Strongly support”.
Policy preference index is an unweighted mean of people’s (z-scored) support for giving blacks (i) preference in the hiring
process and (ii) assistance programs for blacks. For Racial discrimination — housing market, answers were given on
a scale from 0 to 100 (higher values imply more discrimination). For Donation NGO, we count the number of times the
respondent preferred money for the NGO over money for self we count the number of times the respondent preferred money
for the NGO over money for self (scale 0–6). The outcome variables are z-scored using the mean and standard deviation in
the control group. “Treatment” takes value 1 if the respondent received information about the results from the correspondence
study. “Prior > 15” takes value one if our respondents overestimate the extent of racial discrimination. “Republican” takes
value 1 if our respondent identifies as a Republican. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table A.19: Pre-specified regressions: Experiment 2 (Research Now)
Racial discr: serious problem Preference Assistance Pro-black Name-blind Posterior: Racial Inequality due to Affirmative
main follow-up for blacks for blacks policy index screening Belief Effort Discrimination action hurts
Panel A: Main Effect
Treatment 0.110 0.068 -0.050 -0.073 -0.061 -0.004 -3.982 -0.036 0.007 0.025
(0.039) (0.044) (0.043) (0.046) (0.039) (0.047) (0.815) (0.043) (0.045) (0.048)
[0.284] [0.284]
Observations 2073 1716 1721 1721 1721 1721 1702 1720 1716 1721
Panel B: Prior
Treatment × (A) -0.004 0.200 0.082 0.142 0.112 0.257 -13.030 -0.126 -0.097 -0.093
Prior > 15 (0.077) (0.088) (0.087) (0.093) (0.077) (0.094) (1.630) (0.086) (0.090) (0.096)
Treatment (B) 0.111 -0.024 -0.087 -0.139 -0.113 -0.122 2.044 0.022 0.051 0.068
(0.055) (0.062) (0.059) (0.062) (0.052) (0.064) (1.018) (0.060) (0.062) (0.066)
Pr(A+B)=0 0.045 0.005 0.931 0.961 0.985 0.052 0.000 0.093 0.487 0.713
Observations 2073 1716 1721 1721 1721 1721 1702 1720 1716 1721
Panel C: Republican
Treatment × -0.153 0.038 -0.064 -0.087 -0.075 -0.071 2.642 0.014 -0.119 0.191
Republican (A) (0.091) (0.098) (0.102) (0.112) (0.093) (0.108) (1.798) (0.102) (0.103) (0.119)
Treatment (B) 0.149 0.059 -0.033 -0.051 -0.042 0.014 -4.672 -0.039 0.037 -0.025
(0.044) (0.052) (0.049) (0.052) (0.043) (0.054) (0.951) (0.049) (0.052) (0.052)
Pr(A+B)=0 0.959 0.247 0.278 0.164 0.152 0.546 0.188 0.773 0.362 0.120
Observations 2073 1716 1721 1721 1721 1721 1702 1720 1716 1721
Notes: For the outcome Racial discrimination serious problem, answers were given from a scale from 1: “Not a problem” at all to 5: “A very serious problem”. For the outcomes Support
preference for blacks, Support assistance for blacks, and Support name-blind recruitment, answers were given on a scale from 1: “Strongly oppose” to 5: “Strongly support”. Policy
preference index is an unweighted mean of people’s (z-scored) support for giving blacks (i) preference in the hiring process and (ii) assistance programs for blacks. “Racial inequality due
to effort” is people’s agreement to the following statement: “Differences in economic outcomes between whites and blacks are primarily the result of racial discrimination against blacks.”
“Posterior belief” is people’s estimate of the number of times a resume with black-sounding name had to be sent to get one callback. “Racial inequality due to discrimination” is people’s
agreement to the following statement: To what extent do you agree with the following statement: “Differences in economic outcomes between whites and blacks are primarily the result of
whites working harder than blacks.” Responses to these questions are on a 7-point scale where (1) means “strongly disagree” and (7) means “strongly agree”. “Affirmative action hurts” is
people’s response to the question: “Overall, do you think affirmative action programs for the past fifty years have helped blacks, hurt them, or had no effect one way or the other?” People
answer this question on a 7-point scale ranging from (1) strongly helped to (7) strongly hurt. The outcome variables are z-scored using the mean and standard deviation in the control group.
“Treatment” takes value 1 if the respondent received information about the results from the correspondence study. “Prior > 15” takes value one if our respondents overestimate the extent
of racial discrimination. “Republican” takes value 1 if our respondent identifies as a Republican. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table A.20: Pre-specified regressions II: Experiment 2 (Research Now)
Racial discr: serious problem Preference Assistance Pro-black Name-blind Posterior:
main follow-up for blacks for blacks policy index screening Belief
Panel A:
Treatment × (A) 0.000 0.006 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.007 -0.573
Prior (continuous) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.068)
Treatment (B) 0.110 -0.027 -0.103 -0.148 -0.125 -0.128 6.085
(0.063) (0.072) (0.069) (0.072) (0.062) (0.074) (1.268)
Pr(A+B)=0 0.069 0.754 0.134 0.038 0.041 0.089 0.000
Observations 2073 1715 1720 1720 1720 1720 1701
Panel B:
Treatment × (A) -0.167 -0.020 0.092 0.035 0.064 -0.183 -1.145
Male (0.077) (0.088) (0.086) (0.092) (0.077) (0.094) (1.625)
Treatment (B) 0.192 0.079 -0.096 -0.091 -0.094 0.088 -3.404
(0.054) (0.064) (0.059) (0.063) (0.053) (0.064) (1.134)
Pr(A+B)=0 0.652 0.334 0.948 0.404 0.593 0.164 0.000
Observations 2073 1715 1720 1720 1720 1720 1701
Panel C:
Treatment × (A) -0.099 -0.020 0.046 0.008 0.027 -0.075 -1.021
Confidence in prior (0.042) (0.047) (0.048) (0.050) (0.043) (0.053) (0.931)
Treatment (B) 0.439 0.135 -0.203 -0.101 -0.152 0.245 -0.568
(0.143) (0.161) (0.163) (0.174) (0.147) (0.180) (3.149)
Pr(A+B)=0 0.001 0.320 0.182 0.464 0.240 0.188 0.483
Observations 2073 1716 1721 1721 1721 1721 1702
Notes: For the outcome Racial discrimination serious problem, answers were given from a scale from 1: “Not a problem”
at all to 5: “A very serious problem”. For the outcomes Support preference for blacks, Support assistance for blacks,
and Support name-blind recruitment, answers were given on a scale from 1: “Strongly oppose” to 5: “Strongly support”.
“Racial inequality due to effort” is people’s agreement to the following statement: “Differences in economic outcomes be-
tween whites and blacks are primarily the result of racial discrimination against blacks.” “Posterior belief” is people’s estimate
of the number of times a resume with black-sounding name had to be sent to get one callback. The outcome variables are
z-scored using the mean and standard deviation in the control group. “Treatment” takes value 1 if the respondent received
information about the results from the correspondence study. “Prior > 15” takes value one if our respondents overestimate
the extent of racial discrimination. “Republican” takes value 1 if our respondent identifies as a Republican. * p<0.1, **
p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Experiment 2 (Research Now)
 Panel B: Labor market discrimination
Notes: In Panel A, which uses data from Experiment 1 (NORC), answers are given on a scale from 0
to 100 and indicate beliefs about the acceptance rate of black candidates (higher values imply less
discrimination). In Panel B, which uses data from Experiment 2 (Research Now), answers are given on
a scale from 1 to 100 and indicate people’s beliefs about the number of resumes with black-sounding
resumes had to be sent to get one callback (higher values imply more discrimination). The errors bars
indicate the standard error of the mean.
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Beliefs about # of black-sounding CVs to get one callback
c.d.f. of  Democrats 
c.d.f. of  Republicans 


















≤40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Beliefs about rejection rate of black-sounding names
c.d.f. of  Democrats 
c.d.f. of  Republicans 
 Panel B: Housing market discrimination
Notes: This figure uses data from Experiment 1 (the NORC sample). Panel A shows, separately for
Republicans and Democrats, data on beliefs about how many times resumes with black-sounding
names on average had to be sent out to get one callback for an interview. Respondents were informed
that the corresponding number for resumes with white-sounding names was ten (as found in the study
by Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004). Panel B shows, separately for Republicans and Democrats,
using only control group respondents, beliefs about the rejection rate on reservation requests sent
from accounts with black-sounding names. Respondents were initially asked about the percent rate
of acceptances of reservation requests for black-sounding names on Airbnb (true rate is 41 percent,
as found in the study by Edelman et al., 2017). They were told that the corresponding number for
white-sounding names was 49. We have recoded the values to implied rejection rates by subtracting
each estimate from 100. In both panels, the dashed vertical lines indicate the correct answer.
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Number of donations:  Republicans
Notes: The figure, which uses data from control group respondents in Experiment 1 (NORC), shows
distributions of the number of donations to the pro-black civil rights organization for self-identified
Democrats and Republicans separately (the respondents were given a multiple price list where they
could choose between money for themselves and $5 to the pro-black civil rights organization in
increments of $1 from $0 to $5). The figure only includes respondents who completed all choices in
the multiple price list.
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Number of black-sounding CVs to get 1 callback
c.d.f. of  Control 
c.d.f. of  Treatment 
 Panel B: Posterior beliefs
Notes: The figure uses data from Experiment 2 (Research Now). Respondents were asked how many times
they thought resumes with black-sounding names on average had to be sent out to get one callback for an
interview. Respondents were informed that the corresponding number for resumes with white-sounding
names was ten. Panel A shows pre-treatment beliefs asked in wave 1 separately for the treatment and control
group, whereas Panel B shows posterior beliefs asked in wave 2 approximately one week later. The vertical
dashed line indicates the correct answer from the study by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004).
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Notes: The figure shows data from the General Social Survey, http://gss.norc.org/get-the-data.
Respondents were asked whether differences the fact that blacks have “worse jobs, income, and housing
than white people” is “mainly due to discrimination”; the figure shows the fraction of Democrats and
Republicans who agree to this statement.
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 Panel B: Job assistance for blacks
Notes: This figure uses data from Experiment 2 (Research Now). The dots indicate the mean values of
the estimated multiple regression coefficients. The dependent variable in Panel A is support for giving
black candidates preference over equally qualified white candidates in getting a job. The dependent
variable in Panel B is support for giving qualified black candidates assistance in getting a job. Both
outcomes are z-scored. “Inequality: discrimination” and “Inequality: effort” are agreements to the
statements that differences in economic outcomes between blacks and whites are primarily the result of,
respectively, “discrimination against blacks” and “whites working harder than blacks.” Lines indicate
95 percent confidence intervals.
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C Screenshots
Figure A.7: Invitation emails sent out for the experiments with Research Now
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Figure A.8: Consent form in wave 1 of Experiment 2 (Research Now)
Figure A.9: Consent form in wave 2 of Experiment 2 (Research Now)
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D Instructions
D.1 Experiment 1 (NORC)
D.1.1 Elicitation of beliefs about racial discrimination
Researchers from Harvard University and the University of Chicago conducted an
experiment to study racial discrimination in the labor market. They did so by sending
out fictitious resumes to help-wanted ads in Boston and Chicago newspapers.
The resumes were exactly the same except for one thing: the name of the job applicant.
Half of the resumes had typically white-sounding names like “Carrie” and “Todd”.
The other half of the resumes had typically black-sounding names like “Tanisha” and
“Kareem”. The idea was to make sure that the applicants were seen as having identical
qualifications, but that the employers would use the applicants’ names to infer whether
they were white or black.
Resumes with white-sounding names had to be sent out on average 10 times to get one
callback for an interview.
What do you think?
How many times do you think resumes with black-sounding names on average had to be
sent out to get one callback for an interview?
I think resumes with black-sounding names on average had to be sent out
times to get one callback for an interview.
If your answer is the same as what the researchers found, you will be rewarded a




The researchers found that resumes with black-sounding names on average had to be
sent out 15 times to get one callback for an interview.
Since resumes with white-sounding names on average only had to be sent out 10 times
to get one callback for an interview, this means that employers were 50 percent more
likely to give callbacks to applicants with white-sounding names compared to applicants
with black-sounding names.
D.1.3 Self-reported outcomes
In the United States today, do you think that racial discrimination against blacks in the
labor market is a serious problem?




Not a problem at all
Do you support or oppose government and private programs that give qualified black
candidates preference over equally qualified white candidates in getting a job?
Strongly support
Support




Do you support or oppose government and private programs that give qualified black
candidates assistance in getting a job?
Strongly support
Support
Neither support nor oppose
Oppose
Strongly oppose
Name-blind recruitment has been suggested as a way to reduce racial discrimination in
the labor market by hiding the names of the job applicants from their resumes. Do you








D.1.4 Behavioral measure: Donation
In Washington, D.C., several civil rights organizations work to protect individuals from
discrimination in society. One of these organizations, the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil
Rights, tries to help African Americans. One of the organization’s key initiatives aims to
reduce racial discrimination in the workplace by lobbying for political reforms.
Below, you are given the opportunity to financially support the Lawyers’ Committee for
Civil Rights.
Your decision
For each of the 6 choices below, you decide whether the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil
Rights should get money or whether you should get money ($1 equals 1000 AmeriPoints).
We will randomly implement your decision for one of these choices, which involve real
money, so please consider each choice carefully. Each decision has the same chance of
being implemented.
$5 for the organization ©
$5 for the organization ©
$5 for the organization ©
$5 for the organization ©
$5 for the organization ©
$5 for the organization ©
© $0 for me
© $1 for me
© $2 for me
© $3 for me
© $4 for me
© $5 for me
Note: NORC is a non-partisan research organization and has no association with the
Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights. NORC and the AmeriSpeak Panel do not endorse
political or charitable causes.
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D.1.5 Belief extrapolation: Discrimination in the housing market
Researchers from Harvard Business School conducted an experiment to study racial
discrimination in the rental market by sending out reservation requests from invented
accounts to hosts on Airbnb, a website for private rental accommodations.
The requests were exactly the same except for one thing: the name of the person who
sent the request. Half of the requests came from typically white-sounding names, while
the other half came from typically black-sounding names. The idea was that the hosts
would use the applicants’ name to infer whether the reservation requests came from
white or black requesters.
The researchers found that reservation requests from white-sounding names were ac-
cepted 49 percent of the time.
What do you think?
How many percent of the time do you think reservation requests from black-sounding
names were accepted?
I think reservation requests from black-sounding names were accepted
percent of the time.
If your answer is within 2 percentage points of what the researchers found, you will
be rewarded a bonus of $2 (2,000 AmeriPoints) in addition to your current incentive of
2,000 AmeriPoints.
D.1.6 Beliefs about strength of the evidence: Treatment group only
The researchers behind the study on labor market discrimination described earlier in this
survey interpreted their findings as clear evidence of discrimination against blacks in the
labor market.
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To what extent do you agree or disagree with this interpretation of their findings?
Strongly agree
Agree




D.2 Instructions: Experiment 2 – first wave (Research Now)
D.2.1 Consent Form
This study has received ethics clearance by the Oxford University Institutional Re-
view Board.
If subjects have questions about this study or their rights, or if they wish to lodge




I have read the information provided on the previous page.
I understand that I may withdraw from the study at any time.
I have had the opportunity to ask questions about the study.
I understand how to raise a concern or make a complaint.
I understand that I can only participate in this experiment once.
I understand that close attention to the survey is required for my responses
to count.
If you are 18 years of age or older, agree with the statements above, and freely consent




D.2.2 Elicitation of beliefs about racial discrimination
Researchers from Harvard University and the University of Chicago conducted an
experiment to study racial discrimination in the labor market. They did so by sending
out fictitious resumes to help-wanted ads in Boston and Chicago newspapers.
The resumes were exactly the same except for one thing: the name of the job applicant.
Half of the resumes had typically white-sounding names like “Carrie” and “Todd”.
The other half of the resumes had typically black-sounding names like “Tanisha” and
“Kareem”.
The idea was to make sure that the applicants were seen as having identical qualifications,
but that the employers would use the applicants’ names to infer whether they were white
or black.
Resumes with white-sounding names had to be sent out on average 10 times to get one
callback for an interview.
What do you think?
How many times do you think resumes with black-sounding names on average had to
be sent out to get one callback for an interview?
I think resumes with black-sounding names on average had to be sent out
times to get one callback for an interview.
If your answer is the same as what the researchers found, you will be rewarded a bonus
of $2 in panel currency.
D.2.3 Confidence in priors








The researchers found that resumes with black-sounding names on average had to be
sent out 15 times to get one callback for an interview.
Since resumes with white-sounding names on average only had to be sent out 10 times
to get one callback for an interview, this means that employers were 50 percent more
likely to give callbacks to applicants with white-sounding names than applicants with
black-sounding names.
D.2.5 Manipulation check
In the United States today, do you think that racial discrimination against blacks in the
labor market is a serious problem?




Not a problem at all
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D.3 Instructions: Experiment 2 – second wave (Research Now)
D.3.1 Introduction
This survey is conducted by a researcher from NHH Norwegian School of Economics.
In this survey, you will be asked questions on a broad range of different topics. Please
pay close attention to all questions.
By continuing this survey, you acknowledge your consent to participate and that you are
at least 18 years of age.
D.3.2 Obfuscation: Views on investments
Which of the following do you think is the best long-term investment: bonds, real estate,




Stock or mutual funds
Gold
{page break}
Do you, personally, or jointly with a spouse, have any money invested in the stock market






D.3.3 Obfuscation: Views on religion
How important would you say religion is in your own life – very important, fairly
important, or not very important?
• Very important
• Fairly important
• Not very important
{page break}
At the present time, do you think religion as a whole is increasing its influence on





Do you support or oppose government and private programs that give qualified black








Do you support or oppose government and private programs that give qualified black
candidates assistance in getting a job?
Strongly support
Support




Name-blind recruitment has been suggested as a way to reduce racial discrimination in
the labor market by hiding the names of the job applicants from their resumes. Do you









Overall, do you think affirmative action programs for the past fifty years have helped








To what extent do you agree with the following statement: “Differences in economic










To what extent do you agree with the following statement: “Differences in economic










In the United States today, do you think that racial discrimination against blacks in the
labor market is a serious problem?




Not a problem at all
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D.3.6 Elicitation of posterior about labor market discrimination
Researchers from Harvard University and the University of Chicago conducted an
experiment to study racial discrimination in the labor market. They did so by sending
out fictitious resumes to help-wanted ads in Boston and Chicago newspapers.
The resumes were exactly the same except for one thing: the name of the job applicant.
Half of the resumes had typically white-sounding names like “Carrie” and “Todd”.
The other half of the resumes had typically black-sounding names like “Tanisha” and
“Kareem”.
The idea was to make sure that the applicants were seen as having identical qualifications,
but that the employers would use the applicants’ names to infer whether they were white
or black.
Resumes with white-sounding names had to be sent out on average 10 times to get one
callback for an interview.
What do you think?
How many times do you think resumes with black-sounding names on average had to
be sent out to get one callback for an interview?
I think resumes with black-sounding names on average had to be sent out
times to get one callback for an interview.
If your answer is the same as what the researchers found, you will be rewarded a bonus
of $2 in panel currency.
D.3.7 Confidence in posteriors







D.3.8 Willingness to pay for the information (control group only)
We just explained to you the details of a study which tested for racial discrimination in
the labor market.
For each of the seven choices below, you decide whether you would like to receive more
information about the results from the study or whether you would like to receive money.
If you decide to receive the information about the results of the study, we will provide
you with a short summary of the results, including information on the number of times
resumes with black-sounding names had to be sent out in order to get one callback.
If you decide to receive the information about the results of the study, we will also
provide you with a link to the research study which further describes the methodology,
implementation of the experiment, and discusses the research results.
We will randomly implement your decision for one of these choices after the study has










© $0.10 for me
© $0.20 for me
© $0.30 for me
© $0.40 for me
© $0.50 for me
© $0.75 for me
© $1 for me
D.3.9 Information provision (depending on people’s choices)
The researchers found that resumes with black-sounding names on average had to be
sent out 15 times to get one callback for an interview.
Since resumes with white-sounding names on average only had to be sent out 10 times
to get one callback for an interview, this means that employers were 50 percent more




D.4 Instructions: Experiment 3: Racial stereotypes
D.4.1 Terms of participation
General instructions
This study is conducted by The Choice Lab at NHH Norwegian School of Economics.
You must be a US citizen of at least 18 years of age to participate in this study. If you do
not fulfill these requirements, please do not continue any further.
You are not allowed to participate in this study more than once. If you experience a
technical error or problem, do not try to restart or retake the study. Rather, send us an
email with a description of your problem and we will get back to you.
Please note that your participation will be registered on the following Amazon Mechanical
Turk worker ID:
${e://Field/workerId}
The worker ID was retrieved automatically when you clicked on the link that brought
you here. This step is necessary for assigning payments to the right account and to ensure
that you only participate in this study once.
If you have any questions regarding this study, please email thechoicelab@nhh.no.
I have read and understood the above and want to participate in this study. [Yes, No]
D.4.2 Pre-treatment background questions
1. Please indicate your gender. [Male, Female]
2. What is your age? [18–24; 25–34; 35–44; 45–54; 55–64; 65 or older]
3. Which category best describes your highest level of education? [Eighth grade or
less, Some high school, High school degree/GED, Some college, 2-year college
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degree, 4-year college degree, Master’s degree, Doctoral degree, Professional
degree (JD, MD, MBA)]
4. What was your family’s gross household income in 2017 in US dollars? [Less than
$15,000; $15,000 to $24,999; $25,000 to $49,999; $50,000 to $74,999; $75,000 to
$99,999; $100,000 to $149,999; $150,000 to $200,000; More than $200,000]
5. Which of the following best describes your race or ethnicity? [African Ameri-
can/Black; Asian/Asian American; Caucasian/White; Native American, Inuit or
Aleut; Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander; Other; Prefer not to answer]
6. Are you of Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin? [Yes, No]
7. In politics, as of today, do you consider yourself a Republican, a Democrat, or an
Independent? [Republican, Democrat, Independent]
8. In politics, as of today, do you lean towards the Republican Party or lean towards the
Democratic Party? [The Republican Party, The Democratic Party; note: question
only shown to Independents]
D.4.3 Pre-treatment beliefs
In this survey, we will ask you some questions about whites and blacks in America.
Throughout this survey, we will refer to non-Hispanic whites and non-Hispanic blacks as
whites and blacks, respectively.
{page break}
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The General Social Survey (GSS) is a large and representative survey of Americans.
In the survey, people were asked to rank the importance of the following five job
characteristics (from least important to most important):
• High income
• No danger of being fired
• Working hours are short, lots of free time
• Chances for advancement
• Work that is important and gives a feeling of accomplishment
Among whites, which response do you think was most commonly chosen as the least
important characteristic of a job?
High income
No danger of being fired
Working hours are short, lots of free time
Chances for advancement
Work that is important and gives a feeling of accomplishment
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Among blacks, which response do you think was most commonly chosen as the least
important characteristic of a job?
High income
No danger of being fired
Working hours are short, lots of free time
Chances for advancement
Work that is important and gives a feeling of accomplishment
D.4.4 Information treatment
The actual results on which response people most commonly chose as least important
characteristic of a job were as follows:
Among whites, the response “Working hours are short, lots of free time” was most com-
monly chosen as the least important characteristic of a job.
Among blacks, the response “Working hours are short, lots of free time” was most com-
monly chosen as the least important characteristic of a job.
Source: The General Social Survey
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D.4.5 Views on pro-black policies
We will now ask you a few questions about your attitudes towards policies to help blacks
in the labor market.
{page break}
Do you support or oppose government and private programs that give qualified black
candidates preference over equally qualified white candidates in getting a job?
Strongly support
Support
Neither support nor oppose
Oppose
Strongly oppose
{page break, note: We randomize the order of these two questions}
Do you support or oppose government and private programs that give qualified black
candidates assistance in getting a job?
Strongly support
Support





To what extent do you agree with the following statement:
“Differences in economic outcomes between whites and blacks are primarily the result of









D.5 Instructions: Experiment 4: Political Identity
D.5.1 Treatment group
A much debated issue is whether blacks and other racial minorities should get preference
over equally qualified white candidates in getting a job. In contrast to the Democratic
Party, the Republican Party generally opposes all forms of special treatment based on
race. We are interested in what you think about this issue.
Do you support or oppose government and private programs that give qualified black and




Neither support nor oppose
Oppose
Strongly oppose
D.5.2 Control group group
A much debated issue is whether blacks and other racial minorities should get preference
over equally qualified white candidates in getting a job. We are interested in what you
think about this issue.
Do you support or oppose government and private programs that give qualified black and




Do you support or oppose government and private programs that give qualified black and
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